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THE PRICE OF PRIVACY, 1973 TO THE PRESENT
MARY ZIEGLER*
The legal academy has not been kind to the privacy rationale
set forth in Roe v. Wade. Roe is seen to have promoted a single-
issue agenda based on the importance of privacy and choice. Be-
cause Roe so quickly came under attack, its defense became a pri-
ority, and activists speaking out in favor of the opinion felt
encouraged to defend it on its own terms. If the abortion issue
were a matter of ordinary politics rather than constitutional law,
the argument goes, activists would be free to develop more com-
pelling claims for reproductive rights and to pursue a broader re-
productive-health program.
Other scholars have studied work of the social movement’s
activists and attorneys who helped to shape pre-Roe advocacy and
to influence the Court’s decision. This project is unique, however,
in offering the first explanation of the emergence, ascendancy, and
persistence of crucial choice-based claims that have defined the
law and politics of abortion in the past several decades. This his-
tory suggests that Roe alone was not responsible for the emergence
or the staying power of the choice framework. Since 1973, abor-
tion-rights activists prioritized choice arguments not only because
of Roe, but also because of the need to respond to antiabortion
tactics and to changing political opportunities. Ordinary politics
reinforced rather than undermined the choice framework.
Based on this history, this Article argues that de-constitution-
alizing the abortion issue would do little to dismantle the choice-
based frame. At a minimum, the abortion-rights movement will
have to do more to make abortion, and the women who benefit
from it, more visible and sympathetic to the public. Removing the
Constitution from the equation will do little to change this basic
dynamic.
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INTRODUCTION
The legal academy has not been kind to the privacy rationale set forth in
Roe v. Wade.1 Described as the Supreme Court’s most controversial deci-
sion,2 Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,3 struck down the vast
1 For a sample of the scholarship that is critical of Roe’s choice framework, see Cath-
arine MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 52–53 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984) (criti-
cizing Roe’s emphasis on choice and privacy instead of equality); John Hart Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 930 (1973) (argu-
ing that outlawing abortion is not about “governmental snooping” into citizens’ private
lives); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right
to Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 331, 371, 373 (2010); Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 375, 386 (1985) (“Overall, the Court’s Roe position is weakened, I believe, by the
opinion’s concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a
constitutionally based sex-equality perspective.”); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1020 (1984) (“The rhetoric of privacy, as opposed
to equality, blunts our ability to focus on the fact that it is women who are oppressed
when abortion is denied. . . . The rhetoric of privacy also reinforces a public/private
dichotomy that is at the heart of the structures that perpetuate the powerlessness of
women.”).
2 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT Roe v.
Wade Should Have Said: The Nation’s Top Legal Experts Rewrite America’s Most Con-
troversial Decision 3 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (“If Brown v. Board of Education is
America’s most hallowed modern Supreme Court decision, Roe v. Wade is surely its most
controversial.”). A word about terminology is in order here. I refer to supporters of legal
abortion primarily as feminists and abortion-rights activists, and I describe the opposition
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majority of abortion laws then on the books.4 A 7-2 majority opinion in Roe
explained that constitutional protections covering family, marriage, and pro-
creation extended to a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.5 The
Court presented the abortion right as a freedom from state interference—a
right that allowed women to make a crucial life decision without government
meddling.6 In borrowing from Roe’s rhetoric and reasoning, the abortion-
rights movement supposedly offered a similarly impoverished understanding
of reproductive rights, one disconnected from the importance of state assis-
tance for poor women and from other compelling rationales for reproductive
autonomy. Moreover, because Roe so quickly came under attack, movement
members made its defense a priority, and  movement leaders speaking out in
favor of the opinion felt encouraged to defend it on its own terms.7 Other
scholars and commentators have expressed concern that the opinion shaped
the rhetoric of reproductive-rights supporters8 and discouraged them from
pursuing a broader and more promising reproductive-justice agenda.9 On this
as either antiabortion or pro-life. As this Article argues, “pro-choice,” the term favored
by contemporary activists, did not commonly appear until later in the 1970s. For that
reason, this Article refers to movement members as pro-choice only when describing the
views of other scholars or more recent chapters in movement history. While not all abor-
tion-rights supporters were feminists, some of them resembled what Serena Mayeri has
called legal feminists, and this Article refers to them as such. See Serena Mayeri, Consti-
tutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 755, 758 (2004).
3 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
4 See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS
SERVE AMERICA 94–95 (2006) (explaining how the Court’s decision struck down laws on
the books in 46 states).
5 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168–70 (1973).
6 See, e.g., id. at 169–70 (explaining that the “unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child . . . necessarily includes the right of a woman to decide whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy”).
7 See, e.g., Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing
Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1396 (2009) (outlining the “costs to feminist ideals
that are produced by our reliance on the creation of an individual right as the conceptual
vehicle for legal abortion, and our reliance on adjudication as the strategic vehicle for the
right’s development and justification”).
8 Cf. Carol Sanger, About Abortion: The Complications of Category, 54 ARIZ. L.
REV. 849, 871 (2012) (“Without the threatened reversal of Roe looming over everything,
as it has for some 40 years, there is perhaps room to consider aspects of abortion that
were thought too risky, from an advocacy perspective, to discuss.”).
9 See, e.g., West, supra note 7, at 1400 (“Part of the story—maybe the major part—is R
a widespread belief among the pro-choice community in the opinion’s relative vulnerabil-
ity.”). On the spread and costs of “the choice rhetoric of Roe,” id. at 1411, see, for
example, id. at 1401–12. For further discussion of Roe’s costs, see, for example, Rebecca
L. Rausch, Reframing Roe: Property Over Privacy, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST.
28, 31 (2012) (“[T]he right to privacy yields no positive rights to funding or access [to]
support from the government; it is relegated to the land of negative rights, which might
provide the right woman with reproductive choice free from government intrusion, but
for the wrong woman—one with limited resources—the so-called ‘choice’ becomes non-
existent.”); Rachel Rebouche´, The Limits of Reproductive Rights in Improving Women’s
Health, 63 ALA. L. REV. 1, 24 (2011) (“Roe has not been a ready platform for thinking
about abortion in terms of women’s right to health care.”).
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basis, scholars argue that abortion politics would be more meaningful if the
movement deemphasized constitutional law or if the Supreme Court de-con-
stitutionalized abortion altogether.10 These commentators conclude that re-
turning abortion to ordinary politics would make the abortion battle less
polarized, more nuanced, and ultimately more productive.11
Other scholars have studied the social movement activists and attorneys
who helped to shape Roe v. Wade.12 This project adds a new dimension by
offering the first explanation of the emergence, ascendancy, and persistence
of crucial post-1973 choice-based claims that have defined the law and polit-
ics of abortion in the past several decades. The history studied here suggests
that the Supreme Court’s decision alone does not explain the rise or the stay-
ing power of the choice framework.13 Abortion-rights activists prioritized
choice arguments because of the need to respond to antiabortion tactics and
to changing political opportunities. In advancing such claims, movement
members set out an understanding of choice that differed significantly from
that of the Supreme Court. While the Court described abortion as a medical
decision belonging to the physician and patient,14 the abortion-rights move-
10 See, e.g., West, supra note 7, at 1400–01. For further discussion of the costs of the R
constitutionalization of abortion, see ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLIT-
ICS OF VIRTUE: IS ABORTION DEBATABLE? 4 (1993) (explaining that the “result” of the
constitutionalization of the abortion issue was “an ever-deepening cultural divide”); Joan
Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559, 1561 (1991).
11 See, e.g., West, supra note 7, at 1428 (“The need to shoehorn arguments for choice R
into constitutional form has not only forced the ‘right to an abortion’ into its current
truncated and negative form . . . it has also muted arguments for reproductive choice that
are pragmatic and time-bound.”).
12 See, e.g., BEFORE Roe v. Wade: Voices That Shaped the Abortion Debate Before
the Supreme Court’s Ruling (Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel eds., 2d ed. 2012) [here-
inafter BEFORE Roe v. Wade]; GENE BURNS, THE MORAL VETO: FRAMING CONTRACEP-
TION, ABORTION, AND CULTURAL PLURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES (2005); DAVID
GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF Roe v.
Wade (1998); LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE,
AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1867–1973 (1997); Reva B. Siegel and Linda Green-
house, Before (and After) Roe: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L. J. 2052,
2052–72 (2010). William Saletan has offered an in-depth study of why choice arguments
gained influence in the late 1980s—a development that, in Saletan’s view, helped to ex-
plain progress made by the antiabortion movement. See generally WILLIAM SALETAN,
BEARING RIGHT: HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE ABORTION WARS (2003). No previous
study, however, captures the changes made to the choice framework or the reasons for its
staying power.
13 On the reinterpretation of Roe, see generally Mary Ziegler, The Framing of a Right
to Choose: Roe v. Wade and the Changing Debate on Abortion Law, 27 LAW & HIST.
REV. 281 (2009) [hereinafter Ziegler, Framing of a Right to Choose].
14 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (cataloguing the physical and
psychological harms that may result from carrying a pregnancy to term); id. at 164 (hold-
ing that in the first trimester, “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to
the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician”); see also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 13 (1990) (noting that Justice Blackmun
had served as counsel to the Mayo Clinic prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court
and suggesting that he may have been influenced by his medical background to focus the
opinion on the rights enjoyed by physicians); cf. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a
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ment reinterpreted the opinion as a symbol of women’s interests in auton-
omy, privacy, and decisional freedom. Later, movement members
transformed choice arguments to take advantage of changes to the larger
American political landscape: shifts such as the evolution of abortion into a
major political issue, the public’s embrace of a small-government philoso-
phy, and the pro-life movement’s stigmatizing of the abortion procedure. Or-
dinary politics reinforced rather than undermined the choice framework.
Based on this history, this Article argues that de-constitutionalizing the
abortion issue would do little to dismantle the choice-based frame. In order
to build support for a more comprehensive reproductive-justice agenda, the
abortion-rights movement will have to change public attitudes toward sex
equality, the social welfare net, and socioeconomic justice, much as abortion
opponents have worked to change the way the public defines the fetus, the
act of abortion, and the meaning of human life. Choice-based claims have
remained prominent partly because polls indicate that Americans react fa-
vorably to them.15 Changing public attitudes will be difficult, as it has been
in the past. But at a minimum, the movement will have to do more to make
abortion, and the women who benefit from it, more visible and sympathetic
to a public uncomfortable with the procedure. Removing the Constitution
from the equation will do little to change this basic dynamic.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the ascendance of
choice-based arguments in abortion-rights advocacy in the four decades after
1973. As this Section shows, the Court’s decision does not explain the move-
ment’s ongoing attraction to the idea of a right to choose. Indeed, while
stressing concerns about choice, activists substantially reworked Roe’s rheto-
ric, highlighting the rights of women rather than those of physicians. Moreo-
ver, the movement often described a right to choose that is far broader and
more abstract than the one set forth by the Supreme Court. Choice conten-
tions gained prominence in large part because of the political benefits
thought to flow from them.
Part II chronicles the movement’s much-criticized turn to a single-issue
approach to abortion—one in which the abortion issue received more atten-
tion than did other matters of reproductive health. Critics of the Roe decision
suggest that the Supreme Court’s intervention helped to convince pro-choice
activists to privilege abortion at the expense of a more comprehensive ap-
proach to reproductive rights. In preserving a fragile victory, movement
members supposedly had to channel scarce financial resources and political
capital into the abortion struggle, with little left for battles involving child
care, healthcare, or sterilization abuse. This Section questions this conven-
tional account by telling the story of a post-1973 struggle to create a broader
Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199–1200 (1992) (highlighting Roe’s emphasis
on the physician’s judgment).
15 For an example of polls of this kind conducted by the abortion-rights movement,
see E. J. Dionne, Abortion Rights Backers Adopt Tactics of Politics, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
1989, at A6.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\37-2\HLG204.txt unknown Seq: 6 29-MAY-14 11:34
290 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 37
reproductive-justice agenda, focused on issues from contraception to sterili-
zation abuse and child care. Ultimately, when movement dissenters endorsed
a single-issue approach, they did so for practical reasons, including the im-
mediate threat to legal abortion and the lack of support for welfare rights.
Part III explores the normative implications of this history for contemporary
movement activists, and the last Part briefly concludes.
I. THE RISE OF CHOICE ARGUMENTS
In the years since 1973, scholars have identified ways in which the
Court’s idea of privacy has distorted public debate about abortion.16 Robin
West argues that a “widespread belief among the pro-choice community in
the [Roe] opinion’s relative vulnerability” has deterred “criticism of the de-
cision by those who politically support legal abortion.”17 According to West,
feminists avoided criticism of Roe’s choice rhetoric both because the deci-
sion represented a major victory for supporters of legal abortion and because
they feared that the Court would overrule its prior decision.18 As Roe frames
it, abortion as a right to choose protects women from State interference.
However, “the choice rhetoric of Roe undercuts the arguments for . . . the
rights of caregivers . . . to a level of public assistance for their caregiving
work.”19 By failing to expose the shortcomings of this idea of choice, femi-
nists supposedly accepted a framework that legitimated “[a] profoundly in-
adequate social welfare net and hence the excessive economic burdens
placed on poor women and men who decide to parent.”20 Scholars like West
also identify profound “opportunity costs” associated with the constitution-
alization of abortion21: first, by trying so hard to save Roe, the movement
failed fully to pursue a broad reproductive-justice agenda.22 Second, in
16 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 751,
766 (1991); see also Michael J. Klarman, Fidelity, Indeterminacy, and the Problem of
Constitutional Evil, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1739, 1751 (1997) (describing the “conven-
tional understanding of Roe v. Wade” as the notion that, “far from reconciling abortion
opponents to a woman’s fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy, the decision actu-
ally spawned a right-to-life opposition which did not previously exist”).
17 West, supra note 7, at 1400. R
18 Id. at 1400–04; see also MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 51; Marcy Darnovsky, R
“Moral Questions of an Altogether Different Kind:” Progressive Politics in the Biotech
Age, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 99, 110 (2010) (“The battle for abortion rights has be-
come all but synonymous with the term ‘choice,’ and arguments that draw on other values
have long been more muted.”); West, supra note 7, at 1397–98; cf. Mark Tushnet, An R
Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1364–70 (1984) (using abortion as an example of
the instability of constitutionally protected rights).
19 West, supra note 7, at 1411; see, e.g., Sarah London, Reproductive Justice: Devel- R
oping a Lawyering Model, 13 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 71, 81 (2011) (“The
choice to hold fast to Roe, particularly its emphasis on individual rights and privacy, has
alienated many women of color and poor women.”).
20 West, supra note 7, at 1409. R
21 See, e.g., id. at 1426–32; see also infra notes 24 and 25 and accompanying text. R
22 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive
Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324, 327 (1991) (“[T]he
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privileging abortion and choice, feminists might have lost out on alliances
with pro-lifers interested in “minimizing the cost of mothering, enforcing
and strengthening the rights of pregnant women, advocating the responsible
use of birth control, insisting upon sensible anti-rape policies, and discourag-
ing unwanted sex.”23 Finally, commentators conclude that by defending the
Roe decision and a related idea of choice, the movement failed to offer more
compelling or morally nuanced claims, diverting political capital, resources,
and time to the preservation of legal abortion.24
This Section evaluates these criticisms by documenting the lost history
of choice-based arguments for abortion in the aftermath of the opinion. Stud-
ying this history reveals that the abortion-rights movement did not simply
adopt the Supreme Court’s understanding of choice or privacy—far from it.
Instead, in highlighting such arguments, movement members offered a vi-
sion of choice that differed substantially from the one present in the Roe
decision. As importantly, movement members revised their choice argu-
ments in response to changes to the larger political terrain, alternatively em-
phasizing and downplaying concerns about women’s equality and
socioeconomic justice.
Moreover, the decision to emphasize choice arguments reflected much
more than the need to preserve a fragile victory in the Supreme Court. In-
stead, movement members foregrounded choice contentions as a way to gain
influence in electoral politics or to respond to growing public anxiety about
the abortion procedure and the welfare state.
The Section begins by tracing the emergence of choice reasoning in the
pre-1973 abortion-rights movement. Choice arguments flourished in a com-
plex rhetorical agenda that also featured contentions involving equal citizen-
ship for women and authority for doctors. While facing challenges from
their colleagues, movement pragmatists often emphasized the claims thought
most likely to achieve immediate political results. After exploring the terms
and stakes of the Roe decision, the Section next charts the evolution of
choice arguments in the decade after 1973. At first, movement members
offered interpretations of privacy and choice that differed radically from the
Court’s own. While the Roe decision assigned physicians tremendous impor-
tance, activists described abortion as a right belonging exclusively to wo-
men. Equal citizenship for women remains muted in the Court’s decision,
popularity of the abortion debate is a reflection of the position of essentialism because
this debate chooses one issue for debate—abortion—and generally ignores the larger and
more complex problems relating to reproductive health issues, of which pregnancy is
only one part.”).
23 West, supra note 7, at 1432; see also Williams, supra note 10, at 1559–61. R
24 See, e.g., West, supra note 7, at 1428 (contending that “the focus on the abortion R
right has diverted resources not only from political and legal possibilities for promoting
reproductive justice, but also from other forms of social persuasion, including moral ar-
gument, that might reduce the number of unwanted pregnancies women experience”).
For commentators’ perspectives on a better foundation for abortion rights, see supra note
1 and accompanying text. R
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but some movement members explicitly presented the decision as one in-
volving both equality and autonomy for women.
Only in the later 1970s did narrower, choice-based arguments take on
new importance in the movement’s advocacy. In the period, as the Section
shows next, organizations like the National Association for the Repeal of
Abortion Laws (“NARAL”) and the National Organization for Women
(“NOW”) responded to a series of political setbacks: antiabortion victories
in state legislatures, the passage of the Hyde Amendment (a federal ban on
Medicaid funding for abortion), and a series of Supreme Court opinions up-
holding state bans on the public funding of abortion. Movement leaders at-
tributed these defeats to the opposition’s success in electoral politics. In
formulating a response, abortion-rights activists stressed the idea of choice
as a way of maximizing voter support for legal abortion.
The Section then turns to the political opportunities in the 1980s and
1990s that continued to shape NARAL and NOW’s rhetorical strategy. In the
mid-1980s, in a campaign called “Silent No More,” the movement played
up the importance of race and sex equality partly because the idea of a right
to choose had not seemed politically effective in the first few years of the
decade. Later in the 1980s, when these organizations returned to a conven-
tional choice argument, they did so to capitalize on the possibility of passing
a statute to codify Roe, seeking to appeal to Americans ambivalent about
abortion rights. Beginning in the 1990s, when the movement found itself
embroiled in the battle over intact dilation and extraction abortion (intact
D&E), choice-based arguments served to distract public attention from
highly controversial late-term abortions.
As this history makes apparent, movement members forged an idea of
choice that differed considerably from the one advanced by the Court. The
Supreme Court did not determine the prominence of choice arguments or
even control the way in which abortion-rights advocates defined a right to
choose. The ascendancy of a right to choose resulted from inter-movement
dialogue and changing political opportunities as much as from the 1973
decision.
A. Choice Arguments Form One Part of a More Complex
Argumentative Agenda
Before 1973, as David Garrow chronicles, the abortion-rights move-
ment developed a powerful, privacy-based argument that abortion bans were
unconstitutional.25 Outside the courts, by contrast, claims about choice
formed only one part of a much more complex strategy.26 Before 1973, lead-
ing activists sometimes turned to choice arguments. For example, in an-
nouncing the formation of the first single-issue abortion-rights organization,
25 See generally GARROW, supra note 12. R
26 See Ziegler, Framing of Right to Choose, supra note 13, at 281–83. R
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NARAL (then the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws),
Representative Shirley Chisholm, the organization’s honorary president, a
feminist, and a civil rights activist, described the founding as “an historic
occasion in the arduous struggle of American women to free themselves
from oppression and discrimination.”27 She explained that “every woman
must be guaranteed—as her inalienable right—the freedom to choose
whether or not she will bear children.”28 At the same time, however,
Chisholm suggested that women would not exercise that right without super-
vision: the law should treat abortion as “a medical decision between a wo-
man and her physician.” 29
Before Roe, the abortion-rights movement also described abortion as a
public health issue, a matter of good medical practice, and an effective
method of curbing population growth.30 In 1969, for example, the organiza-
tion sent a petition to doctors intended to reflect support in the medical com-
munity for abortion. The petition asserted: “Abortion law repeal is our
concern because we must be able to practice medicine in the best interest of
our patients and according to the highest standards of our profession.”31 By
November 1972, the group circulated pamphlets emphasizing that doctors
supported legal abortion, and NARAL pushed doctors to lobby state legisla-
tures considering repeal.32 NARAL also linked its cause to the then-popular
movement to curb population growth at home and abroad.33 The organiza-
tion’s debate handbook included arguments that legal abortion might have
prevented the birth of Hitler34 and might “decrease the number of unwanted
children . . . and possibly subsequent delinquency, drug addiction, and a host
of social ills . . . . ”35
Of course, before Roe, feminists offered rights-based claims for abor-
tion that went beyond the vision of choice Chisholm originally articulated.
Within NARAL, feminists such as Chisholm, Betty Friedan, and Conni Fin-
nerty urged the organization to tie abortion more closely to women’s rights
to self-determination and equal citizenship.36 The National Organization for
27 Press Release, Shirley Chisholm, NARAL Pro-Choice America (Sept. 29, 1969)
(available in The Lawrence Lader Papers, Countway Medical Library, Harvard
University).
28 Id.
29 Id. (emphasis added).
30 See, e.g., Ziegler, Framing of a Right to Choose, supra note 13, at 281–83. R
31 Petition, NARAL (n.d., ca. 1969) (available in the NARAL Papers, MC 313, Car-
ton 1, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
32 Meeting Minutes, NARAL Executive Committee (Nov. 27, 1972) (available in the
NARAL Papers, MC 313, Carton 1, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
33 See, e.g., Ziegler, Framing of a Right to Choose, supra note 13, at 281–87. R
34 Excerpt, NARAL Speaker and Debater’s Handbook (n.d., ca. 1972) (available in
the NARAL Papers, MC 313, Carton 7, Debating the Opposition, Schlesinger Library,
Harvard University).
35 Id.
36 For examples of Finnerty, Freidan, and Greitzer’s work in NARAL, see Feminists
Use Lysistrata Tactic, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1970, at G11 (describing the work of
NARAL leader Conni Finnerty in organizing feminist protests); Eileen Shanahan, Doctor
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Women, a group that Friedan led, at times described abortion as a civil right
for women.37 Essays by Florynce Kennedy of NOW and Frances Beal of the
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee insisted that abortion made a
particular difference for women of color, who connected abortion rights to
contraception, sterilization abuse, child care, and broader reproductive-jus-
tice concerns.38 Similarly, in February 1969, feminist group the Redstock-
ings interrupted state legislative hearings on abortion to demand a forum for
women to air their concerns.39
Nancy Stearns, a young civil rights attorney at the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights, worked to translate women’s protests into constitutional law,
particularly in Abele v. Markle, a successful pre-Roe challenge to Connecti-
cut’s abortion laws.40 When the Markle Court handed down its decision in
1972, it drove home the connection between abortion and equal citizenship
between men and women.41 Concluding that “society now considers women
the equal of men,” the court held that “[t]he essential requirement of due
process is that the woman be given the power to determine within an appro-
priate period after conception whether or not she wishes to bear a child.”42
Generally, however, the abortion-rights movement prioritized argu-
ments thought likely to increase the odds of reform. For example, when in
1969 NARAL presented abortion as a method of birth control, feminist
member Lucinda Cisler urged her colleagues to approach their cause in a
way that would resonate with powerful allies, particularly those in the popu-
lation-control movement.43 Similarly, when deciding how to bring a consti-
Leads Group’s Challenge to Michigan Anti-Abortion Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1971, at
28 (Freidan and Geitzer’s attempting to reframe the conversation from doctors’ rights to
women’s rights); Letter from Conni Finnerty et al. to NARAL Board of Directors (Aug.
30, 1969) (available in the NARAL Papers, MC 313, Carton 1, Schlesinger Library,
Harvard University) (Friedan endorsing abortion-rights protests on Mother’s Day).
37 See, e.g., Betty Friedan, Abortion: A Woman’s Civil Right, in BEFORE Roe v. Wade,
supra note 12, at 38–40. R
38 For Beal and Kennedy’s essays, see DIANE SCHULDER & FLORYNCE KENNEDY,
ABORTION RAP (1971); Frances Beal, Black Women’s Manifesto; Double Jeopardy: To Be
Black and Female, in BEFORE Roe v. Wade, supra note 12, at 52. R
39 On the Redstockings protest, see, for example, Edith Evans Asbury, Women Break
Up Abortion Hearing: Shouts for Repeal of Law Force Panel to Move, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 1969, at 42. For further discussion of the Redstockings and abortion, see, for example,
FLORA DAVIS, MOVING THE MOUNTAIN: THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE
1960 89 (1999); ALICE ECHOLS, DARING TO BE BAD: RADICAL FEMINISM IN AMERICA
1967–75 140 (1989).
40 See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, IN OUR TIME: MEMOIR OF A REVOLUTION 111
(2000); Amy Kesselman, Women Versus Connecticut: Conducting a Statewide Hearing
on Abortion, in ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950–2000 53–56
(Rickie Solinger ed., 1998).
41 Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 802 (D. Conn. 1972).
42 Id. at 804.
43 See Memorandum from the NARAL Planning Committee to the NARAL Board of
Directors (Sept. 27, 1969) (available in the NARAL Papers, MC 313, Carton 1, Schles-
inger Library, Harvard University) (explaining that NARAL should frame its cause in a
way that population control groups could support and that NARAL should “lead the way
in encouraging many groups to declare that all forms of birth control are useful . . .”).
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tutional challenge to Michigan’s abortion law, the press summarized the
view of leading NARAL members that “courts would more easily strike
down state anti-abortion laws if the test case were presented in terms of
interference with . . . medicine than if it were done on the basis that many
women’s rights groups have advocated.”44
B. After Roe, Movement Members Transform the Court’s
Understanding of Choice
We now associate the Supreme Court’s decision with the choice argu-
ments played up by contemporary abortion-rights activists. However, the
limited idea of choice so often attacked by scholars did not inevitably
emerge after the Court’s decision. Indeed, in the mid-1970s, movement
members transformed the Court’s privacy rhetoric, expressing bold ideas
about the relationship between sex equality and fertility control.
Roe itself held that abortion fell under the protection of a right to pri-
vacy related to contraception, procreation, marriage, and family formation.
Pro-choice activists did not immediately echo the rhetoric of the opinion.
Indeed, movement organizations quickly popularized their own interpreta-
tions of Roe’s holding, emphasizing concerns about equal citizenship.
When narrower ideas of choice gained prominence, abortion-rights ac-
tivists viewed them as an effective tool in battling political setbacks of the
mid-1970s: the passage of federal and state bans on the public funding of
abortion and a series of related defeats in the Supreme Court. Choice-based
arguments figured centrally in movement efforts to influence electoral polit-
ics or to maximize the appeal of legal abortion. Finally, as Reva Siegel and
Serena Mayeri have shown, feminists’ battle for the Equal Rights Amend-
ment (ERA) to the Constitution—an amendment that would have prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sex—eventually discouraged sex-equality ar-
guments for abortion. Fearing that the controversy surrounding abortion
would undercut the momentum of the ERA, feminists had another reason for
presenting their demands in terms of choice.
The movement’s new emphasis on choice rhetoric began with the
Court’s decisions in Roe and Doe v. Bolton.45 Roe involved a Texas statute
that prohibited all abortions but those necessary to save the life of the
mother.46 The Roe Court identified two state interests served by abortion
bans—those involving the health of the woman and the life of the fetus. On
the other side of the ledger, Roe claimed, was a “right of privacy . . . broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
44 Shanahan, supra note 36. R
45 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
46 Roe, 410 U.S. at 117–18. By contrast, Doe involved a statute patterned on the
American Legal Institute (ALI)’s model reform: the statute allowed abortions subject to
particular restrictions, requiring, among other things, several diagnoses by licensed physi-
cians and the subsequent approval of a hospital committee. Doe, 410 U.S. at 182 n.4.
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pregnancy.”47 This right already protected constitutional interests involving
marriage, procreation, contraception, and parenting.48 Just the same, under
Roe, women alone could not make the ultimate decision, since both physi-
cians and women had to participate in reaching a solution. Before viability,
“the attending physician, in consultation with his patient,” was “free to de-
termine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the
patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.”49
In Justice Blackmun’s view, Roe’s privacy rhetoric would deescalate
conflict about abortion, distracting attention from issues like “population
growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones [that] tend[ed] to compli-
cate and not to simplify the problem.”50 By approaching the abortion issue
with “constitutional measurement,” as Roe explained, the Court hoped to
make its decision “free of emotion and of predilection.”51 As importantly,
privacy rhetoric made the abortion right part of a recognizable constitutional
tradition.52
Almost immediately, in the political arena, abortion-rights organiza-
tions adopted varying interpretations of the privacy and choice the Supreme
Court had spotlighted. In meaningful ways, however, abortion-rights sup-
porters often departed from the language of the Roe opinion, describing
broader rights more closely connected to women’s needs. For example,
NOW at times stressed the importance of “the freedom to choose” without
mentioning any interest belonging to physicians.53 Similarly, in a 1973 fun-
draising letter, the organization described abortion rights as recognizing that
“government should not abridge your freedom to choose the size and spac-
ing of your family.”54 As NOW described it, the Roe decision had recog-
nized a right to choose that went beyond abortion and had little to do with
the advice or control of the physician—a right for all women to control
child-bearing and child-rearing. As importantly, according to NOW, abor-
47 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
48 See id. at 152–53.
49 Id. at 163. On Roe’s framing of the issue as one of physicians’ rights, see, for
example, Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rheto-
ric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 85–86 (1995) (“Under Roe,
the physician . . . is constitutionally required to lead the decisionmaking process.”); Scott
Moss & Douglas M. Raines, The Intriguing Federalist Future of Abortion Rights, 88 B.U.
L. REV. 175, 178 (2008) (describing Roe’s “doctor-focused”—rather than woman-fo-
cused—justification).
50 Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
51 Id.
52 See id. at 153 (establishing that the abortion right belonged to a larger privacy
tradition).
53 See, e.g., Letter from Wilma Scott Heide, President, NOW, to Friends of NOW
(n.d., ca. 1973) (available in The Wilma Scott Heide Papers, Box 11, Folder 12, Schles-
inger Library, Harvard University).
54 Letter from Wilma Scott Heide, President, NOW, to potential donors (n.d., ca.
1973) (available in The Wilma Scott Heide Papers, Box 11, Folder 14, Schlesinger Li-
brary, Harvard University).
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tion rights belonged to individual women rather than to physicians and pa-
tients, regardless of what the Court had held.
Between 1973 and 1977, NOW and NARAL brought to the surface sex-
equality arguments only hinted at in the Roe decision. In October 1976, for
example, NOW began describing Roe as a decision based on “the constitu-
tional rights to equal protection and to privacy.”55 In Congress, NARAL
leader Sarah Weddington contended that “women cannot take advantage of
[equal] opportunities . . . if they cannot control their fertility.”56 In a resolu-
tion on reproductive rights, NOW similarly stressed that “a woman’s right to
control her body is basic to controlling her life economically, socially, and
spiritually.”57 A later resolution called for improvements to “the availability
of abortion, especially to the poor.”58 The resolution also made clear that
abortion-rights activists did not inevitably respond to Roe by narrowing their
demands. Indeed, the resolution committed NOW to fighting sterilization
abuse and to demanding legislation guaranteeing sex education, childcare,
and prenatal and childbirth care available to all.59
In the immediate aftermath of Roe, members of groups like NARAL
and NOW stressed both choice-based claims and those related to women’s
equal citizenship. NOW voted for a resolution setting forth a broad repro-
ductive-justice agenda, and members of both organizations argued for a right
to choose belonging to women rather than to physicians and patients. The
Roe decision did not immediately spark the ascendancy of problematic argu-
ments about a right to choose. After 1973, abortion-rights activists described
reproductive rights far more capaciously than those set forth by the Court.
C. Movement Emphasis on Electoral Politics Increases the
Appeal of Choice
In 1976–1977, the political terrain shifted, encouraging NOW and
NARAL to focus on a narrower idea of reproductive choice. The momentum
for a redefinition of the abortion-rights cause began in 1976, when Congress
passed the Hyde Amendment, a ban on federal Medicaid funding for abor-
tion.60 Every year beginning in 1977, abortion-rights activists battled to stop
55 Mailing, NOW, “Chronology of Major Events Affecting Women’s Right to Choose
Abortion – 2600B.C. – Present” (Oct. 3, 1978) (available in The NOW Papers, MC 496,
Box 54, Folder 42, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University) (emphasis added).
56 Meeting Minutes, NARAL Executive Committee (Apr. 13, 1975) (available in The
Betty Friedan Papers, 71-62-81-M23, Carton 43, Folder 1462, Schlesinger Library,
Harvard University).
57 NOW Resolution: Reproductive Rights (n.d., ca. 1977) (available in The NOW
Papers, MC 496, Box 23, Folder 64, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
58 NOW Resolution on Reproductive Rights (n.d., ca. 1978) (available in The NOW
Papers, MC 496, Box 24, Folder 22, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
59 Id.
60 On the Hyde Amendment, see, for example, David E. Rosenbaum, Congress Ap-
proves Curb on Abortions, But Veto Is Likely, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1976, at 1.
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the further tightening of narrow exceptions to the Hyde ban.61 In 1977, the
Supreme Court fueled antiabortion interest in the funding issue by upholding
several state funding bans.62
In the aftermath of the passage of the Hyde Amendment, abortion-
rights activists channeled new energy into electoral politics at the state and
federal level. A NARAL press release declared, “[t]he right to choose abor-
tion is under serious attack with recent Congressional and state actions limit-
ing public funding for legal abortion care.”63 As Missouri abortion-rights
activists Sylvia Hampton and Donna Jones explained, with the Court’s 1977
decisions upholding bans on state funding for abortion and the proposed
constitutional convention for a human life amendment, “the message was
clear—the battle would be shifted from the courts to the political arena.”64
In 1979, NARAL’s four-day national conference pushed success in
electoral politics to the fore. To succeed in electoral politics, NARAL devel-
oped messages that made no mention of abortion procedure, sex equality, or
welfare rights.65 Instead, bumper stickers and public information drives un-
derlined the popularity of choice.66 One campaign button, which read “I am
Pro-Choice—and I vote,” reflected the supposed power of voters supporting
abortion rights.67  Karen Mulhauser, then-NARAL Executive Director, elab-
orated on these arguments in a major NARAL fundraising campaign.68
Mulhauser wrote, “Why, you ask, are [abortion opponents] succeeding de-
spite the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court? The answer is simple: they have
frightened and intimidated our political leaders. . . . The battle for liberty is
won or lost at the polls, in the legislatures, and in the courts.”69 Mulhauser
also made apparent the kinds of choice-based claims NARAL would stress
in appealing to voters, presenting the struggle as “more than a battle be-
61 On the yearly struggle to determine the scope of Hyde restrictions, see, for exam-
ple, Karen De Witt, Foes of Abortion Seek to Tighten Restrictions on Medicaid Funds,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1979, at B20; Martin Tolchin, Financing Bill and Abortion: Both
Sides Emphasize Question of Conscience, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1980, at A19; Martin
Tolchin, But Now There Is Pressure of Time and Money to Reach Agreement, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1977, at 176.
62 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470–78 (1977) (upholding a Connecticut Medicaid
funding ban on abortion); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1977) (sustaining a ban
on the use of St. Louis public hospitals for abortion); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445–54
(1977) (upholding a Pennsylvania law that limited Medicaid funding for abortions).
63 Press Release, NARAL (June 1978) (available in the Reproductive Health Services
Papers, University of Missouri-St. Louis).
64 SYLVIA HAMPTON & DONNA J. JONES, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES, INVOLV-
ING SIGNIFICANT OTHERS: HEALTH RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROGRAM GUIDE (1978) (availa-
ble in the Reproductive Health Services Collection, University of Missouri-St. Louis).
65 See, e.g., Leslie Bennetts, For Pro-Abortion Group, An “Aggressive New Cam-
paign,” N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1979, at C22.
66 See, e.g., id.
67 Id.
68 Letter from Karen Mulhauser, Executive Director of NARAL, to Fellow Citizens
(n.d., ca. 1979) (available in the Reproductive Health Services Collection, University of
Missouri-St. Louis).
69 Id.
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tween liberal and conservative ideologies,” and as “a test of whether our
society will protect the rights of the individual to lead his or her own life,
free of the dictates and dogma of others.”70
In 1980, the organization reaffirmed the importance of claims involving
a right to choose.71 As part of an initiative called Impact ‘80, NARAL mem-
bers encouraged politicians to support legal abortion by arguing that a ma-
jority of voters demanded it.72 By extension, NARAL approached the
abortion issue in a way calculated to win the support of an ambivalent pub-
lic.73 As the Chicago Tribune reported in 1980, NARAL had “adopted a less-
offensive connection to abortion; it now calls itself ‘pro-choice,’ recognizing
that many persons generally opposed to abortion nonetheless believe it is not
a government’s prerogative to forbid it.”74
NARAL’s choice-based arguments spread throughout the abortion-
rights movement. In 1979, in its own fundraising campaign, Planned
Parenthood argued: “In the face of the outright attack on the most personal
of human rights . . . [w]e must defend the right to choose.”75 Nationally, as
early as 1978, state abortion-rights organizations held abortion rallies with
titles such as “Freedom Is the Right to Choose.”76 In October 1979, the
national movement organized a major protest event, Abortion Rights Action
Week, around the idea of choice. As one mailing promoting the events in
Missouri explained, the most important goal was to “work together to show
our elected representatives . . . the political reality of the abortion issue—we
are the majority, we are pro-choice, AND WE VOTE!”77
Activists did not respond solely to the Supreme Court or act only to
preserve constitutional protections for abortion. Movement members also re-
acted to a series of political setbacks. During the 1980 presidential cam-
paign, Ronald Reagan had promised to nominate antiabortion judges to the
federal bench,78 and the Republican Party Platform endorsed a fetal-life
70 Id.
71 See, e.g., Michael Knight, Drive for Abortion Rights Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1980, at A12; Richard Phillips, The Shooting War Over ‘Choice’ or ‘Life’ is Beginning
Again, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 20, 1980, at J3.
72 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 71. R
73 See, e.g., id.
74 Id.
75 Letter from Faye Wattleton, President, Planned Parenthood, to Membership (n.d.,
ca. 1979) (available in the Dr. Joseph Stanton Papers, The Dr. Joseph R. Stanton Human
Life Issues Library and Resource Center, Sisters of Life, Bronx, New York).
76 Schedule, Freedom Is the Right to Choose: Rally for Abortion Rights, Reproduc-
tive Health Services (June 1978) (available in the Reproductive Health Services Collec-
tion, University of Missouri-St. Louis).
77 Statement of Purpose, Abortion Rights Alliance et al., Abortion Rights Action
Week (Fall 1978) (available in the Reproductive Health Services Collection, University
of Missouri-St. Louis). For similar claims, see, for example, Brochure, American Civil
Liberties Union, The ACLU’s Campaign for Choice: The Right of a Woman to Control
Her Own Body (n.d., ca. 1978) (available in the Reproductive Health Services Collection,
University of Missouri-St. Louis).
78 See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Politics of the Bench: Carter and Reagan Seek Gains From
Prospective Judiciary Appointments, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1980, at A27.
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amendment.79 In 1981, Congress began considering a proposed statute, the
human life bill that would recognize fetal personhood under the Fourteenth
Amendment.80 Shortly thereafter, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) offered a
human life amendment that would overrule Roe and return the abortion issue
to the states.81 In 1980, the Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, ending any
hope that the courts would undo abortion funding bans.82
With abortion rights newly in jeopardy, the abortion-rights movement
turned to popular and uncontroversial choice-based claims in trying to re-
build support for abortion rights and reestablish their political influence.
Since the 1980 election, as NARAL made such an effort, its membership had
increased from 90,000 to 140,000, and the organization had already raised
$400,000 for the 1982 campaign.83 The choice frame played an important
part in NARAL’s efforts to build grassroots political support in 17 key
states.84
In the same period, NOW deemphasized the abortion struggle. The or-
ganization had also experienced a fundraising surge since the 1980 election,
raising $1.3 million a month since December 1981, the vast majority of
which went into the campaign for the ERA.85 Since the late 1970s, NOW had
worked to separate arguments for abortion and the ERA, fearing that contro-
versial reproductive politics would doom the Amendment’s chances of ratifi-
cation.86 This focus created tension between NOW and NARAL; as NARAL
leader Nanette Falkenberg explained, NOW’s strategy had “caused disagree-
ment with other organizations and . . . caused animosities.”87 Only after the
“new ERA” failed in the House did NOW put greater emphasis on the abor-
79 See, e.g., Arthur Siddon and Jon Margolis, GOP Ignores Plea, Sticks with Its ERA
Stand, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 10, 1980, at 1; Warren Weaver, Jr., Republicans Also Back Pro-
posed Amendment to Prohibit Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 9, 1980, at A1.
80 On the human life bill, see, for example, Joan Beck, The Pro-Life Groups Turn to
Congress on Abortion, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1981, at B2; Bernard Weinraub, Abortion
Becoming a Top Priority Issue in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1981, at A18.
81 On the Hatch Amendment, see, for example, Leslie Bennetts, Antiabortion Forces
in Disarray Less than a Year After Victories in Election, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1981, at
B5 [hereinafter, Bennetts, Antiabortion Forces].
82 For the Court’s decision on this point, see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
83 See Ann Crittenden, Pro-Abortion Group Sets a Major Political Drive, N.Y.
TIMES, Jun. 14, 1982, at B10.
84 See, e.g., id.
85 See, e.g., Jane Perlez, NOW’s Funds Soar Suggesting Extent of Women’s Power,
N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1982, at C1.
86 See, e.g., Serena Mayeri, A New E.R.A. or a New Era?: Amendment Advocacy and
the Reconstitution of Feminism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1223, 1274 (2009) (“Opponents’
unremitting efforts to derail the amendment on this basis drove many proponents to elide
or even deny the connection despite their firm conviction that reproductive freedom and
sex equality were inextricably intertwined.”); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for
Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56
EMORY L. J. 815, 827 (2007) (“In this period, sex equality arguments for the abortion
right were extinguished politically in the fight over the Equal Rights Amendment.”).
87 Perlez, supra note 85. R
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tion issue, focusing on the opposition’s flaws.88 For example, Judy Gold-
smith, then-President of NOW, stressed the violence associated with the
antiabortion fringe.89 In an appearance before the National Press Club in
Washington, D.C. in February of 1985, Goldsmith said, “‘Terrorism is not
acceptable under any circumstances. . . . We will not back down to bullies
using terrorist tactics, and we will not simply yield the clinics to these
people.’” 90
D. The Movement Downplays Choice Arguments in an Effort to
De-Stigmatize Abortion
By 1985, recent political developments led activists to reconsider the
efficacy of conventional arguments based on the idea of a right to choose. In
1983, Reagan nominee Sandra Day O’Connor attacked the reasoning of the
Roe Court, increasing the antiabortion movement’s interest in reshaping the
courts.91 In 1984, Reagan, an avowed enemy of the abortion-rights move-
ment, easily won reelection, making seemingly inevitable the nomination of
another antiabortion justice.92 The antiabortion movement itself developed a
powerful new weapon, a 28-minute film, “Silent Scream,” narrated by for-
mer NARAL leader Bernard Nathanson.93 In the film, Nathanson describes
images taken from an ultrasound of the abortion of a 12-week-old fetus.94
The film attracted the attention of the Reagan Administration and proved to
88 On the failure of the new ERA, see, for example, Susan Bennett, “New” ERA
Downed in House, PHILA. DAILY INQ., Nov. 16, 1983, 1983 WLNR 75568; Susan
Trausch, ERA Supporters Say Fight Will Continue, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 16, 1983, 1983
WLNR 56099. For NOW’s arguments of this kind, see, for example, George E. Curry,
Falwell, NOW Clash in Abortion Debate, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 1985, at 5; Ken Fireman,
NOW Plans 25 Vigils on Weekend to Halt Violence at Abortion Clinics, PHILA. DAILY
INQ., Jan. 18, 1985, 1985 WLNR 224214; Joyce Gemperlein, NOW: Reagan Fueling
Antiabortion Attacks, PHILA. DAILY INQ., Mar. 16, 1984, 1984 WLNR 178080. For an
excellent overview of the struggle for the “new ERA,” see generally Mayeri, supra note
86. R
89 See Curry, supra note 88. R
90 Id.
91 For O’Connor’s opinion in Akron I, see Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
462 U.S. 416, 459 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Even assuming that there is a
fundamental right to terminate pregnancy in some situations, there is no justification in
law or logic for the trimester framework adopted in Roe and employed by the Court today
on the basis of stare decisis.”). On O’Connor’s shifting pro-life perceptions, see generally
TRIBE, supra note 14, at 167. R
92 On Reagan’s support for the antiabortion movement during and after the 1984 elec-
tion, see, for example, JAMES HAROLD FARNEY, SOCIAL CONSERVATIVES AND PARTY
POLITICS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 55 (2012); Margaret Ross Sammon, The
Politics of the U.S. Catholic Bishops: The Centrality of Abortion, in CATHOLICS AND
POLITICS: THE DYNAMIC TENSION BETWEEN FAITH AND POWER 11, 18 (2008).
93 On “Silent Scream,” see, for example, Dena Kleiman, Debate on Abortion Fo-
cuses on Graphic Film, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1985, at B8.
94 See Betty Cuniberti & Elizabeth Mehren, ‘Silent Scream’ Abortion Film Stirs
Friend, Foe, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1985, at A1.
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be a media sensation.95 In the courts, in politics, and in the media, abortion
rights seemed more at risk than ever.
These setbacks prompted movement leaders to reconsider the value of
choice-based arguments. The movement’s emphasis on choice, calculated to
sway elections, had done little to stall the momentum of Ronald Reagan and
other candidates opposed to abortion. Choice-based arguments did not seem
to undercut the new, multimedia fetal-rights claims so successfully promoted
by abortion opponents in the mid-1980s. Pro-choice activists experimented
with emphasizing the way that abortion had benefitted real women rather
than abstract values of choice and freedom. The movement’s new rhetoric
drew new attention to the intersection of reproductive rights, sex discrimina-
tion, racial bias, and poverty.
Efforts to reformulate the movement’s arguments began at a February
1985 meeting, when NARAL members agreed that the movement
“need[ed] to find new ways to articulate the right to choose abortion.”96 As
a solution, as NARAL explained in a strategy memorandum entitled “Impact
of Focus on Women Strategy Weekend on ‘Silent No More,’” the organiza-
tion revived what had made abortion rights activists successful in the 1970s:
efforts to de-stigmatize abortion and to stress the connections not only be-
tween abortion and autonomy but also between abortion and race and sex
equality.97 The memorandum explained that “the right to abortion was won
in large part because women began to speak out about abortion, to say ‘we
are your mothers, daughters, and sisters, and we are the ones having illegal
abortions.’” 98 After 1973, the memorandum asserted, women no longer
spoke out, and “the silence left us vulnerable to attack and reinforced old
feelings of guilt and shame.”99
“Silent No More,” the campaign that resulted from this effort, departed
significantly from previous choice-based claims. NARAL, NOW, and
Planned Parenthood solicited 40,000 letters from men and women who had
experiences with abortion.100 The letters did not defend the importance of
95 See, e.g., id.
96 Memorandum, NARAL, Abortion Rights: Silent No More (n.d., ca.1985). On the
date and early discussion of the Silent No More Campaign, see Memorandum, “Focus on
Women” Campaign and “Abortion Rights Silent No More” Action, Nanette Falkenberg
to NARAL Affiliates (Feb. 27, 1985) (available in the NARAL Pro-Choice Massachu-
setts Papers, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
97 Memorandum, Impact of Focus on Women Strategy Weekend on “Silent No
More,” (Apr. 29, 1985) (available in the NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts Papers, Box
16, Folder 14, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
98 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
99 Id. For further discussion of the “Silent No More Campaign,” see, for example,
Statement, NARAL, Abortion Rights: Silent No More, Overall Goals, Themes, and Ap-
proaches (Feb. 1985) (available in the NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts Papers, Box
16, Folder 14, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University) (explaining the organization’s
interest in “chang[ing] the message of the pro-choice movement to include an increased
emphasis on women, and to make a personal emotional connection to the need for
choice”).
100 See Cuniberti & Mehren, supra note 94. R
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choice, freedom, or privacy in the abstract. Instead, the letters provided
widely varied and deeply personal stories about “positive feelings about
abortion” and other “positive things [that could] result [from it].”101
The letters NARAL accumulated called for a broader reproductive jus-
tice agenda. First, women of color wrote to explain that it was “very hard to
talk about ‘choice’ when there isn’t money, [. . .] when racism pervades
every aspect of life.”102 The letters encouraged NARAL leaders to “view
abortion as part of a larger struggle—a struggle to create a world in which
economic and social circumstances allow women to truly have choice both
to avoid unwanted pregnancy and to have wanted children that will be cared
for.”103 At the same time, “Silent No More” would allow activists to make
abortion more visible and to make discussion of the procedure more nuanced
—to serve as a reminder of the fact that “the 1.5 million women who have
abortions each year are much more than faceless, nameless human beings.
They are individuals who are important in our lives.”104 NARAL encouraged
members not to “focus only on the hardship cases” or to describe abortion
as a “tragedy.”105 Instead, the program would legitimate the very idea of
abortion, convincing the “American people that every woman who chooses
to have an abortion does so for reasons that are compelling . . . .”106
“Silent No More,” like the choice-based arguments, reflected move-
ment interest in increasing public support for abortion. Of course, the “Silent
No More” campaign more closely resembled an equality frame than had
earlier claims made by NARAL earlier in the 1980s. As part of the program,
NARAL members openly discussed important, but often uncomfortable, is-
sues: the intersection of race, poverty, and lack of access to reproductive
health care choice.107 However, this shift in message came because NARAL
leaders believed that “Silent No More” would be more politically effective
than either the privacy rhetoric set out in Roe or the choice-based under-
standing of it forged by movement members. In a memo designed to guide
responses to questions from the media, NARAL suggested the following
sample answer: “[t]he majority of people in this country are pro-choice. We
101 Kay Mills, Pro-Choice Advocates Deliver a Different Message on Abortion, L.A.
TIMES, Jun. 2, 1985, at E3. For further discussion, see, for example, Dudley Clendinen,
The Veterans of Abortion Fight Back by Speaking Up, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1985, at E5;
Ellen Goodman, Abortion Supporters Stand to Be Counted, CHI. TRIB., May 24, 1985, at
A1.
102 Memorandum, Impact of Focus on Women Strategy Weekend, supra note 97. R
103 Id.
104 Press Release, NARAL, “ABORTION RIGHTS: Silent No More” (Mar. 20,
1985) (available in the NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts Papers, Box 16, Folder 14,
Schlesinger Library, Harvard Library).
105 Memorandum from Nanette Falkenberg, Executive Director, NARAL, to NARAL
Leadership (n.d., ca. May 1985) (available in the NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts
Papers, Box 16, Folder 14, Schlesinger Library, Harvard Library).
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Memorandum, Impact of Focus on Women’s Strategy Weekend, supra
note 97. R
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want to be certain that when the Court reviews Roe that the majority is visi-
ble and that the climate in this country is clearly pro-choice. ‘Silent No
More’ is the first step in making that happen.”108
NOW used a similar approach in the aftermath of a bitter leadership
struggle. In the middle of the “Silent No More” campaign, Eleanor Smeal, a
former NOW President, challenged Judy Goldsmith for the NOW Presi-
dency, claiming that members wanted the group to be more outspoken and
active. Both Smeal and Goldsmith, however, agreed that abortion should be
“the bottom-line fight in the women’s rights struggle.”109
When Smeal emerged victorious, NOW forged an argumentative strat-
egy that somewhat resembled the “Silent No More” campaign. In 1986,
Smeal, who favored more direct-action protest, led the first “March for Wo-
men’s Lives.”110 The event was designed to demonstrate to politicians that a
majority of Americans favored legal abortion.111 In addition to creating an
advantage in what Smeal called “the numbers game,” the march drew on the
kind of equality-based, personalized claims tied to “Silent No More.”112 At
the event, for example, feminist Gloria Steinem, a featured speaker, argued:
“The desire to control the production of children is the definition of the
patriarchal structure.”113 Smeal echoed these concerns, asserting: “You can-
not sacrifice women on the altar of self-righteousness.”114
Between 1987 and 1993, as the political terrain shifted again, the move-
ment largely abandoned the arguments used as part of the “Silent No More”
campaign, instead updating narrower, choice-based contentions. In 1989, a
plurality on the Supreme Court, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
criticized Roe’s trimester framework,115 and some commentators predicted
108 Memorandum from Nanette Falkenberg, Executive Director, NARAL, to NARAL
Leadership, “How to Answer Questions from The Media” (n.d., ca. 1985) (available in
the NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts Papers, Box 16, Folder 14, Schlesinger Library,
Harvard University).
109 Kay Longcope, NOW Launches Abortion Rights Campaign on Eve of Leadership
Vote, BOS. GLOBE, Jul. 20, 1985, 1985 WLNR 139018; see also Candidates for NOW
Presidency Clash, WICHITA EAGLE, Jul. 21, 1985, 1985 WLNR 1177126.
110 On the March for Women’s Lives, see, for example, 80,000 Demonstrate for
Abortion Rights, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 1986, at 3; Jane Meredith Adams, 85,000 March to
Support Right of Choice in Abortion, Birth Control, BOS. GLOBE, March 10, 1986, 1986
WLNR 299729; Jonathon Feurbringer, 80,000 in March to Capitol to Back Right to Abor-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1986, at A1; Dick Polman, Abortion Rights Advocates Take
Their Cause to The Street, PHILA. DAILY INQ., Mar. 11, 1986, http://articles.philly.com/
1986-03-11/entertainment/26085434_1_abortion-bus-women-president, archived at http:/
/perma.cc/3AFQ-6U85.
111 See 80,000 Demonstrate for Abortion Rights, supra note 110 (referring to claims R
made at the march about the existence of an abortion-rights majority).
112 See id.
113 Adams, supra note 110 R
114 Id.
115 492 U.S. 490, 502–22 (1989).
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that the Justices would soon overrule the 1973 opinion.116  For the abortion-
rights movement, Webster confirmed the appeal of political strategies for
protecting abortion rights.117 In 1992, this intuition seemed correct, as abor-
tion-rights supporters took control of Congress and the White House.118 Ac-
tivists went so far as to promote a bill in Congress that would create far-
reaching protections for abortion rights.119 As the movement emphasized
electoral and legislative solutions, choice-based arguments, believed to have
wide appeal, became more strategically significant.
In 1987, NARAL first began turning back to conventional choice-based
contentions.120 Organization leaders noted growing public fatigue with the
abortion issue and increased competition for money and supporters with
other pro-choice groups.121 As importantly, NARAL members predicted that
the 1988 election season would bring to power a more moderate group of
leaders open to arguments for abortion rights.122 In order to appeal to this
moderate audience, the organization developed a new message and a strate-
gic plan that would be implemented in the next six years.123 Under the cir-
cumstances, choice contentions had a practical appeal. If the movement had
to reason with political leaders and voters ambivalent about abortion, choice-
based contentions seemed advantageous.
E. The Battle for the Freedom of Choice Act Narrows Activists’
Choice Arguments
After 1989, when the Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of a
Missouri antiabortion statute, movement members had an additional reason
to highlight the importance of choice: the struggle for federal statutory pro-
tections. The Supreme Court’s September 1989 decision in Webster upheld
parts of a restrictive Missouri law, and five Justices openly criticized Roe’s
trimester framework.124 Webster convinced the movement that it could no
longer count on the Court to safeguard abortion rights. For instance, Sharon
Rodine of the National Women’s Political Caucus said in September 1989
that Webster “proved . . . [that] the only real protection for women’s repro-
116 See Mary Ziegler, Ways to Change: A Reevaluation of Article V Campaigns and
Legislative Constitutionalism, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 969, 994 (2009) [hereinafter Ziegler,
Ways to Change].
117 See, e.g., Saletan, supra note 12, at 222. R
118 See e.g., id.
119 See e.g., id.
120 See, e.g., NARAL, Six-Year Strategic Plan (Mar. 12, 1987) (available in the
NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts Papers, Box 28, Folder 15, Schlesinger Library,
Harvard University).
121 See, e.g., id.
122 See, e.g., id.
123 See, e.g., id.
124 492 U.S. at 502–22.
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ductive rights [was] political power.”125 A reinterpretation of Roe—one
based on rights for women and the importance of freedom of choice—be-
came a tool for rallying voters and members of Congress seeking to create
federal statutory protections of abortion rights.126 First proposed in 1989, the
federal Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA) prohibited any state from restricting
“the right of a woman to choose to terminate a pregnancy” prior to viability,
or at any time “if such termination is necessary to protect the health life or
the health of the woman.”127 While opponents disputed its precise impact,
FOCA’s supporters claimed that it would codify the result of Roe, prohibit-
ing regulations that the Roe Court would have struck down and allowing
restrictions that it would have upheld.128 At a minimum, FOCA would have
prevented the states from introducing abortion restrictions already rejected
by the Court.129
The question became how best to promote FOCA. After conducting
polls and focus groups on which message would resonate most with voters,
NARAL settled on “Who Decides.”130 A journalist wrote, “the new theme is
that the battle over the legality of abortion is less about abortion itself than
over whether the government will decide who can have one.”131
As then-NARAL President Kate Michelman explained at a strategy ses-
sion, the “key” idea was “indiv[idual] decisionmaking.”132 Focusing on
choice and autonomy would educate the public about NARAL’s values: an
interest in “autonomy/free + informed consent,” the “protection of the vul-
nerable incapable of making decisions,” and “justice + fairness.”133 But as
NARAL consultant Gina Glantz explained, there was “more of an accept-
ance” of approaches spotlighting “responsible decision-making.”134 By con-
125 See Ziegler, Ways to Change, supra note 116 (quoting statement of Sharon R
Rodine, National Women’s Political Caucus (Sept. 6, 1989) available in The NOW Papers
(MC 496, Box 91, Folder 25, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
126 See, e.g., id.
127 The Freedom of Choice Act of 1989, S. 1912, 101st Cong. § 2(a) (1989), archived
at http://perma.cc/6AKV-8CNG.
128 On the debate about FOCA’s impact, see, for example, Robert Eckert, Letter to the
Editor, Abortion Rights Law Wouldn’t Work Anyway; Parties and Justices, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1992, 1992 WLNR 3272786 (arguing that “the effect of a freedom of choice act
would be that a woman’s ‘right’ to choose abortion would be at the sufferance of a tempo-
rary majority in Congress”); Laura Mecoy, Abortion-Rights Bill Unveiled: Cranston-
Mitchell Plan Anticipates Adverse Ruling, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 26, 1992, 1992
WLNR 4466314.
129 See, e.g., Tony Mauro & Mimi Hall, A “Setback” for Abortion Rights, U.S.A.
TODAY, Dec. 8, 1992, 1992 WLNR 2227216 (describing FOCA as “a measure that would
sharply limit states’ ability to restrict abortion”).
130 For a comprehensive discussion of “Who Decides,” see generally Saletan, supra
note 12. R
131 Dionne, supra note 15. R
132 Handwritten Notes, NARAL Strategy Meeting (n.d., ca. 1993) (available in the
NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts Papers, Box 28, Folder 15, Schlesinger Library,
Harvard University) (discussing messaging).
133 Id.
134 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\37-2\HLG204.txt unknown Seq: 23 29-MAY-14 11:34
2014] The Price of Privacy, 1973 to the Present 307
trast, focusing on socioeconomic equality or fairness often proved
challenging. “[P]eople don’t want to pay for so many abortions,” Glantz
reasoned.135 “Who Decides” and the choice framework became models of
movement success.136 As NARAL leaders later explained, the campaign was
“considered to be the single most effective and enduring message generated
by the reproductive rights movement.”137
Again, the emphasis put on choice-based arguments reflected the
changing political opportunities available to the abortion-rights movement.
During the battle to introduce statutory protections for abortion, NARAL
and other pro-choice groups had political reasons to argue that FOCA would
not dramatically change the current legislative landscape. In January 1990,
when pro-choice activists set out a strategy for passing FOCA, abortion op-
ponents described the statute as “sweeping” and worried that it would create
entitlements to government support.138 Don Johnson of the National Right to
Life Committee (NRLC), the largest national antiabortion organization, con-
tended that it was “not clear that some of the very minimal regulations that
have survived Roe v. Wade would continue to survive” if FOCA were to
pass.139 For Johnson, Roe represented the political and legal status quo—one
in which the states had power to pass some reasonable restrictions on abor-
tion. He suggested that FOCA created rights broader than those recognized
by the Roe Court.140
Pro-choice activists generally responded that FOCA would at most cod-
ify Roe, thereby allowing states some room to regulate abortion. Senator
Don Edwards (D-CA), a chief proponent of FOCA in Congress, argued that
Roe’s “central holding is the constitutional right of a woman to have an
abortion prior to viability.”141 Kate Michelman of NARAL also insisted that
FOCA was not “a radical bill that goes farther than Roe v. Wade.” 142
The FOCA battle forced members of the abortion-rights movement to
balance ideological commitments and political pragmatism—a task that ulti-
mately divided supporters of legal abortion.143 On the one hand, supporters
135 Id.
136 See id.
137 Mailing, NARAL and NARAL Foundation’s Expanded Reproductive Health
Agenda (n.d., ca. 1993) (available in the NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts Papers, Box
28, Folder 15, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
138 See, e.g., Dan Balz, Abortion-Rights Strategy: A Move to Thwart States, WASH.
POST, Jan. 23, 1990, at A23.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Don Edwards, Why We Need the Freedom of Choice Act, WASH. POST, May 23,
1993, at C7 (internal quotations omitted).
142 Kate Michelman, Unwarranted Interference, WASH. POST, July 19, 1993, at A15.
143 See, e.g., Kevin Merida, House Judiciary Panel Advances Bill to Ban Most State
Curbs on Abortion, WASH. POST, May 20, 1993, at A8 (“Some Democratic leaders have
been . . . frustrated that abortion rights advocates have not been able to work out com-
promises that could help ensure the bill’s passage.”) (“There will be Democratic and
Republican, moderate and conservative supporters and opponents of FOCA, depending
on how the bill is worded.”).
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of FOCA were disappointed that it did not address the gaps in the Court’s
abortion jurisprudence, particularly those involving the rights of poor and
minority women. Senator Carol Moseley-Braun (D-IL) withdrew her support
for the bill, stating “I am concerned the bill allows the states to discriminate
against young and poor women seeking an abortion. . . . I cannot support a
bill that trades off the rights of some women for the promise of rights for
others.”144 In July 1993, when the House voted 255-178 in favor of a restric-
tive version of the Hyde Amendment, Kim Gandy of NOW asserted that
FOCA would “compromis[e] the rights of young women and poor women
and rural women.”145 By 1993, NOW, the ACLU, and the National Black
Women’s Health Project had promised to oppose any version of FOCA that
allowed for bans on public funding for abortion or laws requiring parental
consultation.146
On the other hand, some movement members recognized that they
might have to accept an imperfect version of the bill to win key congres-
sional votes.147 “[G]iven the political climate and the makeup of the Senate
and the House,” argued Kate Michelman of NARAL, “you gain what you
can gain, and you build on that.”148 Choice-based arguments appeared more
likely to achieve this goal than contentions involving the rights of poor,
often non-white women. As the FOCA debate reflected, political leaders re-
mained ambivalent about the idea of welfare rights. By contrast, a philoso-
phy of individualism promised to win the support of legislators who did not
strongly support abortion rights.
The divisions plaguing the abortion-rights movement helped to doom
the statute.149 Notwithstanding FOCA’s failure, NARAL continued empha-
sizing choice-based contentions, albeit for different reasons. It seemed that
the opposition had successfully stigmatized the abortion procedure. In re-
sponse, rather than highlighting the benefits of legal abortion, NARAL pro-
moted a “broad program of reproductive health” and a goal of making
abortion “less necessary.”150 NARAL’s new rhetorical agenda emphasized
that every woman should be guaranteed the right “to make personal deci-
sions regarding a full range of reproductive choices, including preventing
144 Jon Sawyer, Moseley-Braun Rejects Abortion-Rights Bill, ST. LOUIS POST DIS-
PATCH, July 10, 1993, at 1B.
145 Karen Schneider, Proposed Law Splits Pro-Choice Camp, PHILA. DAILY INQ.,
July 18, 1993, 1993 WLNR 1987022.
146 Id.
147 See, e.g., Michael Kinsley, Between Bork and ‘Roe’: Toward a Democratically
Enacted Choice Law, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1992, 1992 WLNR 5561583 (conceding that
“[e]nacting the Freedom of Choice law will involve debate and compromise over mat-
ters such as parental notification, a waiting period, late abortions and so on”); Schneider,
supra note 145. R
148 Schneider, supra note 145. R
149 On the failure of FOCA, see, for example, Ziegler, Ways to Change, supra note
116, at 999–1000. R
150 Memorandum, NARAL, NARAL and the NARAL Foundation’s Expanded Repro-
ductive Health Agenda (n.d., ca. 1993).
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unintended pregnancy, bearing healthy children, and choosing legal
abortion.”151
“Real Choices” reflected the stigma attached to abortion while reaf-
firming the movement’s faith in choice arguments.  In expanding its reform
platform, NARAL portrayed its goal as the protection of an abstract form of
choice. This new strategy reflected popular discomfort with the idea of abor-
tion. While recognizing the need for a broader agenda, “Real Choices” de-
scribed abortion as both a fundamental right and a trauma most women
wanted to avoid. Abortion politics, at least as much as constitutional law,
ensured the prominence of these arguments.
As we shall see, in the later years of the Clinton presidency, the mo-
mentum for FOCA faded, and abortion opponents began a long and public
push for a federal ban on a particular late-term procedure, intact dilation and
extraction (intact D&E), popularly labeled “partial-birth abortion.”152 The
partial-birth abortion struggle intensified at a time when an abortion oppo-
nent occupied the White House and the Supreme Court seemed increasingly
hostile to abortion. Moreover, the years between 1992 and 2004 witnessed
the creation of a powerful, new justification for state interference in women’s
reproductive decision-making that came to the forefront of political debate.
The focus on “partial-birth abortion” allowed abortion opponents to argue
forcefully that women needed protection against their own bad decisions.
For the pro-choice movement, the years after 1992 were marked by an
increased hostility to abortion rights in the political and judicial arenas.
Faced with increased opposition, NARAL emphasized choice-based argu-
ments believed to enjoy a relatively high degree of popular support. As the
public seemed more opposed to late-term abortion, activists again high-
lighted the issue of choice instead of explaining the need for particular pro-
cedures, as the next section will show.
F. Responding to a Resurgent Pro-Life Movement, Activists Favor
Choice-Based Claims
In 1992, the abortion-rights movement faced another setback when
Planned Parenthood v. Casey abandoned Roe’s trimester framework in favor
of a much less protective undue burden test.153 While Casey had a devastat-
ing impact on the abortion-rights movement’s ability to fight state-level re-
strictions, the Court’s opinion offered a rhetorical framework that worried
pro-lifers, placing unprecedented emphasis on the connection between fertil-
ity control and equal citizenship and explaining that the State could “not, [in
the abortion context,] insist, without more, upon its own vision of the wo-
151 Id.
152 This Section later explores the history of the Partial-Birth Abortion Act in greater
depth.
153 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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man’s role.”154 Casey played into a fear already expressed by some abortion
opponents: the pro-life movement had lost ground because the public be-
lieved it to be anti-woman. For example, prominent abortion opponent John
Willke argued that the public ignored the antiabortion message “because
they didn’t think we were compassionate to women.”155 In an effort to appear
sympathetic to women, pro-lifers pushed bans on intact D&E abortions, con-
tending that these procedures psychologically scarred the women who chose
them.156 In Congress and the states, the campaign against “partial-birth abor-
tion” created new problems for an abortion-rights movement already strug-
gling to adapt to the post-Casey constitutional landscape.157
Beginning in 1996, the NRLC and other antiabortion groups began
pushing for federal legislation banning the late term abortion procedure
known as intact dilation and extraction.158 The impetus for the campaign
came in 1992, when an abortion opponent infiltrated the national conference
held by the National Abortion Federation (NAF).159 Life Advocate, an an-
tiabortion newsletter, published images and text from a speech given at the
NAF Conference about the procedure.160 Leaders of the NRLC took the arti-
cle to Representative Charles Canady (R-FL), a leading opponent of abortion
in Congress, who helped them coin the term “partial birth abortion.”161
Congress passed laws against the procedure in 1996 and 1998 before
then-President Bill Clinton vetoed the measure each time.162 Focusing on
abortion procedures, particularly those performed late in a woman’s preg-
nancy, seemed to do short-term political damage to the abortion-rights
154 Id. at 852.
155 John Willke & Barbara Willke, Why Can’t We Love Them Both?, Remarks at the
Seventh University Faculty for Life Conference (June 1997), transcript archived at http://
perma.cc/5CVW-XLH3.
156 On the connection between partial-birth abortion and woman-protection antiabor-
tion arguments, see, for example, Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:
Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1716–32 (2008).
157 James Bopp and Richard Coleson would later argue that “[t]he debate over par-
tial-birth abortion has furthered this strategy [of framing the abortion issue to the pro-life
movement’s advantage] because it has forced the pro-abortion camp to publicly defend a
particularly visible and gruesome practice.” Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Rich-
ard E. Coleson to Whom It May Concern (Aug. 7, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/
V5G2-TKJV.
158 On the movement for such a ban in the mid-1990s, see, for example, Neil A.
Lewis, Abortion Foes Rally in Capitol To Urge Changes in the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1996, at B8; Robert Pear, House Votes Ban on a Method Used in Late Abortions, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at A1.
159 See, e.g., Cynthia Gorney, Gambling on Abortion: Why Both Sides Think They
Have Everything to Lose, HARPER’S BAZAAR, Nov. 1, 2004, 2004 WLNR 22620830.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 On the vetoes, see, for example, Katharine Q. Seelye, Veto Sustained on Bill to
Ban Some Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1998, at A1; Robin Toner, A Veto, A Condem-
nation, and Possible Political Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1996, at B7.
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movement. A 1996 Gallup Poll found that over 50% of respondents favored
a so-called partial-birth abortion ban.163
In the midst of the partial-birth abortion struggle, political opportunities
and poll data convinced abortion-rights activists to stress choice rather than
more controversial claims about welfare rights or the need for legal late-term
abortions.164 In August 1999, NARAL held a strategy conference focused on
the latest abortion poll data. The polls showed that most Americans reacted
favorably to arguments emphasizing “[s]ex education” and the “mitigating
factors that make abortion a reasonable option,” including threats to the
“life or health of the mother, rape [or] incest.”165 As importantly, the public
favored arguments about “[l]ibertarian values,” claims that choice was “a
mainstream American Value,” and that the abortion-rights movement dealt
“with more than a single issue.”166
G. The Partial-Birth Abortion War and Generational Turnover Solidify
Choice Arguments
In 2000, with the election of George W. Bush, the abortion-rights
movement faced a new series of obstacles. By 2003, Bush had signed the
Partial-Birth Abortion Act into law, and Congress pushed measures protect-
ing unborn victims of crime and revoking FDA approval of RU 486, an
emergency contraceptive.167 In responding to these developments, NARAL
confirmed its emphasis on choice-based arguments. In January 2003, for ex-
ample, NARAL renamed itself “NARAL Pro Choice America.”168 As Kate
Michelman explained: “Through our name change we are underscoring that
our country is pro-choice.”169 As it had in the late 1970s, NARAL responded
to setbacks by working to convince politicians of the political value of abor-
tion and to persuade voters that a broader and more abstract freedom of
choice, not abortion, was the primary issue at stake. In this context, privacy
or choice-based claims served a political purpose, drawing attention away
from a stigmatized abortion procedure. Again, political circumstances, not
just constitutional law, shaped NARAL’s strategy.
In a difficult political climate, the movement also deemphasized the
abortion issue, playing up less controversial reproductive issues like contra-
163 Lydia Saad, Americans Agree with Banning “Partial-Birth Abortion”, GALLUP
(November 6, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/9658/americans-agree-banning-par-
tialbirth-abortion.aspx archived at http://perma.cc/U8QX-7VUK.
164 See, e.g., Meeting Notes, NARAL, NARAL Conference: Expanding CHOICE for
America (Aug. 27–29, 1999) (available in the NARAL Pro-Choice Massachusetts Papers,
Box 49, Folder 1, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 See, e.g., ALESHA DOAN, OPPOSITION & INTIMIDATION: THE ABORTION WARS &
STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL HARASSMENT 98–102 (2007).
168 Jennifer Lee, Abortion Rights Group Plans a New Focus and a New Name, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at L19.
169 Id.
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ception.170 This shift, however, came in response to antiabortion victories in
the early 2000s: the signing into law of the federal Partial Birth Abortion
Act, changing poll numbers indicating a loss of support for the pro-choice
movement, and challenges in recruiting younger advocates to the cause.171 In
April 2004, in responding to these setbacks, abortion-rights groups organ-
ized another March for Women’s Lives, the first since 1992.172 The march
echoed the choice-based message the movement had prioritized in the late
1970s. A NARAL leader, for example, asserted that “[m]ost Americans
support a woman’s right to choose.”173 To build a majority, however,
NARAL would focus “on privacy and access to a range of reproductive
services, not just abortion.”174
In 2005, NARAL and other reproductive-rights organizations rein-
forced this message after conducting the Heartland Tour, an effort to poll
state affiliates and voters about the efficacy of different arguments for repro-
ductive justice.175 The conclusion taken from this effort, as Nancy Keenan of
NARAL explained, was that “[p]rochoice advocates must not only commu-
nicate their opposition to [antiabortion] attacks but also convey what poli-
cies they support.”176 As Keenan explained, a broader reproductive justice
agenda would “contextualize abortion within a continuum of women’s
health care needs.”177 These arguments gained influence between 2006 and
2008, as South Dakota passed a far-reaching ban on abortion178 and the Su-
preme Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003 in Gonza-
les v. Carhart.179 Health-based claims also appeared more likely to appeal to
the younger Americans the abortion-rights movement so desperately wanted
to reach.
Antiabortion organizations had been experimenting with ways to reach
younger recruits since the 1990s.180 Groups like Feminists for Life and Stu-
dents for Life began operating on college campuses.181 These efforts seemed
170 See, e.g., Robin Toner, Abortion Rights Marchers Vow to Fight Another Bush
Term, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at A1.
171 See id.; Sarah Kliff, A New Generation Awakening, JOURNAL GAZETTE, Feb. 10,
2012, 2012 WLNR 3129518.
172 See id.
173 Robin Toner, A Call to Arms by Abortion Rights Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2004, at A20.
174 Id.
175 See, e.g., Nancy Keenan, Going Positive on Prevention, CONSCIENCE, Dec. 22,
2006, at 25, available at ProQuest 195120037.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 On the South Dakota abortion ban, see, for example, Monica Davey, South Da-
kota Bans Abortion, Setting Up Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at A1.
179 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
180 For examples of these efforts, see Feminists for Life Targeting Colleges, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1996, 1996 WLNR 361040; Melissa Healy, Feminists for Life Keys on
Prevention, Not Abortion, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1997, 1997 WLNR 5642077.
181 See, e.g., John Jalsevac, Hundreds of Pro-Life Student Groups Sweeping Across
U.S. College Campuses, LIFESITENEWS.COM (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.
lifesitenews.com/news/students-for-life-of-america-raising-up-a-new-generation-of-pro-
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to pay off: in May 2009, in the Annual Beliefs and Values Survey conducted
by the Gallup Corporation, 51% of those surveyed identified themselves as
“pro-life,” an increase of 7% since 2008.182 A January 2010 Marist/Knights
of Columbus poll suggested that this increase could be attributable to gener-
ational change: 58% of eighteen to twenty-nine year olds and 60% of thirty
to forty-four year olds agreed that abortion was morally wrong.183
By contrast, as Nancy Keenan joked, the pro-choice leadership was
“the menopausal militia”—reflecting the concern that the leadership was
aging and the movement had not effectively connected with younger wo-
men.184 Movement leaders worried that women born after 1973 understood
neither the threat to legal abortion nor the struggles of women who lacked
access to the procedure before Roe.185 Indeed, by 2009, for the first time in
fifteen years, polls taken by the Pew Research Center and the Gallup Corpo-
ration showed that a majority of respondents identified as pro-life.186
Some abortion-rights supporters attributed this shift to their movement’s
“fail[ure] to acknowledge that many find abortion deeply troubling, even if
they support the core principle of choice. ”187 Generally, however, abortion-
rights groups worked to recruit younger supporters by “focusing on issues
less controversial . . . such as the rising price of birth control on college
campuses.”188 The decision to make choice more abstract and less directly
connected to abortion came not only in response to Roe but also in response
to the changing political circumstances of the 1990s and 2000s.
Of course, throughout the period studied here, feminists in the academy
forged bold new ways of understanding reproductive decision-making, in-
cluding theories centered on reproductive justice and equal citizenship.189
Nonetheless, since 1973, the choice framework has enjoyed considerable in-
life-warrio, archived at http://perma.cc/9FF8-EJM3; Mary Meehan, Feminists for Life on
Campus, HUM. LIFE REV., July 2008, at 64.
182 See Lydia Saad, More Americans Pro-Life Rather than Pro-Choice for First Time,
GALLUP,  May 15, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/118399/more-americans-pro-life-
than-pro-choice-first-time.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/FSW7-Z5WG.
183 See Lisa Socarras, Generation Y: The Pro-Life Generation, NAT’L. CATHOLIC
REG, Nov. 2, 2010, www.ncregister.com/daily-news/generation-y-the-pro-life-generation,
archived at http://perma.cc/PGX9-B68A.
184 Stephanie Simon, The New Abortion Warriors, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, 2008
WLNR 1210660; see also Kliff, supra note 171. R
185 See Editorial, A Call to a New Generation to Fight On, STAR LEDGER, June 8,
2012, 2012 WLNR 12033184; Kliff, supra note 171; Simon, supra note 184; Laura Ses- R
sions Stepp, For Abortion Rights, A Changing of the Guard, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2004,
at C1.
186 See Saad, supra note 182; see also Support for Abortion Slips, PEW RESEARCH R
CTR. (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.pewforum.org/Abortion/Support-for-Abortion-Slips.
aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/536F-8KDX.
187 Simon, supra note 184.
188 Id.
189 For discussion of the reproductive-justice movement, see ASIAN CMTYS. FOR
REPROD. JUSTICE, A NEW VISION FOR ADVANCING OUR MOVEMENT FOR REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE, archived at http://perma.
cc/8H3Z-L38Q.
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fluence, although its prominence has varied over time. The Supreme Court’s
intervention—and the movement’s interest in consolidating a fragile consti-
tutional victory—only partly explain the influence of a single-issue, choice-
based approach. At times, social-movement dialogue made the framework
seem more (or less) advantageous. The shifting political landscape made
choice-based claims appear more effective under some circumstances than
others. As we have seen, the choice framework has deficiencies, but its
prominence stems as much from ordinary politics as from the demands of
constitutional law.
A few general observations become clear from the history considered
here. First, the choice framework associated with Roe gained (or lost) promi-
nence for reasons unrelated to the rhetoric or relevance of the Court’s deci-
sion. Choice-based rhetoric became more influential partly because of the
claims made by abortion opponents and the changing political opportunities
available to each side. Second, the choice framework did not always resem-
ble the idea of privacy set forth in Roe. The Court’s decision justified the
importance of reproductive choice by reference to the consequences of un-
planned pregnancy or child-rearing for women.190 In Roe, the abortion right
was one of several privacy interests related to contraception, marriage, and
procreation, although physicians had a unique stake in the abortion right.191
By contrast, the choice framework used by movement activists was much
more changeable and abstract. “Choice” tended to belong to women, rather
than physicians, and it tended to protect individual self-determination rather
than narrower interests in sex and reproduction.
Finally, the choice framework changed considerably over time. The
“right to choose” invoked only abortion at various points, while at other
times it covered a broader variety of reproductive health services. On some
occasions, choice rhetoric tied privacy and equality interests to one another,
while on others it addressed only individual freedom from government inter-
ference. Roe only partly explains the emergence and persistence of the
choice framework.
Insofar as the choice framework offers an example, ordinary politics
have contributed to the prominence of what many believe to be a problem-
atic justification for abortion rights. Part III will explore the normative im-
plications of this fact. But what role did the Court’s decision in Roe play in
the emergence of a single-issue approach to reproductive law and politics?
Feminist critics suggest that the opinion encouraged the pro-choice move-
190 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,153 (1973) (discussing the “psychological harm,”
“distress,” “stigma of unwed motherhood,” and other difficulties women suffered as a
result of unplanned pregnancies in rationalizing the privacy right protecting abortion as
necessary to prevent psychological harm).
191 See id. at 152–53, 164 (explaining that “[f]or the stage prior to approximately the
end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician” and linking the abortion
right to interests in procreation, contraception, marriage, and parental rights) (emphasis
added).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\37-2\HLG204.txt unknown Seq: 31 29-MAY-14 11:34
2014] The Price of Privacy, 1973 to the Present 315
ment to abandon other reproductive-justice issues in order to protect legal
abortion. Part II revisits this issue by developing an account of efforts to
create a far-reaching reproductive-rights agenda. A group of radical femi-
nists and women’s health activists fought for the kind of broad reform the
Supreme Court supposedly undermined. This strategy lost influence when
American politics shifted to the right, chipping away at support for welfare
rights and increasing the threat to constitutional protections for abortion. The
Court’s decision in Roe played only one role in a much more complex story.
II. BEYOND ABORTION: EXPANDING THE AGENDA, 1973–1981
Much as the Roe decision did not inevitably lead supporters of abortion
rights to emphasize unsatisfying choice arguments, the Supreme Court’s in-
tervention did not prompt the entirety of the abortion-rights movement to
gravitate toward a single-issue agenda. This Section focuses on a group of
movement dissenters who impacted debate about the relationship between
feminism and healthcare for women. By spotlighting these advocates, this
Section recaptures the voices of those who did not see Roe as a reason for
pursuing a single-issue agenda. Moreover, telling the story of feminist wo-
men’s health activists makes clear how ordinary politics forced even the
most uncompromising activists to turn to a single-issue strategy.
The Section centers on the decade after Roe, since this period held out
the most promise for feminists seeking to craft a broad reproductive-justice
agenda. Feminists celebrated victory in Roe v. Wade, pushed for a federal
ERA, and drew on ideas offered by an emerging group of feminists of color.
Even in this promising period, however, a rapidly changing political terrain
undermined attempts to advance a broad reproductive-justice agenda. The
history of the decade after the Roe decision offers particularly powerful testi-
mony about how ordinary politics obstructed the progress of a multi-issue
platform.
This Section begins by tracing efforts in the late 1970s to move beyond
a single-issue agenda. It examines the origins of this campaign in the late
1960s, exploring the influence of a potent movement to change healthcare
delivery for women. Activists pursued legal protections against sterilization
abuse and demanded state support for childcare, family planning, and health-
care. The Section next examines the reasons for the decline of a multi-issue
agenda in the early 1980s, when abortion opponents and social conservatives
made substantial gains in Congress and the White House. With new power in
Congress, antiabortion legislators posed an imminent threat to legal abortion.
Significantly, shifting abortion politics figured in a general shift to the politi-
cal right. Once a subject of academic study, neoliberalism—a policy vision
of individual liberty, deregulation, limited government, and the superiority
of free markets—became a compelling political message spread by Ronald
Reagan and his allies in Congress. Leaders of both the Republican and Dem-
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ocratic Parties embraced the rhetoric of small government that Reagan
championed. Far from seeing welfare rights as a crucial part of reproductive
freedom, neoliberalism presented state support as a source of dysfunction
and unnecessary expense. In this new political climate, feminists came to
view a broader reproductive justice agenda as a lost cause.
A. Movement Dissenters Respond to Roe by Creating a
Multi-Issue Agenda
The creation of a broader reproductive-rights strategy began partly in
the feminist women’s health community.192 In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
feminists developed a forceful critique of the medical establishment, claim-
ing that it failed to inform, respect, or help women. These concerns grew in
response to controversies in the early 1970s involving contraception, danger-
ous drugs, and sterilization abuse. In the wake of these scandals, women’s
health activists worked to create a broad reform program in which abortion
played only one part. Even in addressing abortion, they emphasized the im-
portance of government support for women who could not afford reproduc-
tive healthcare.  Members of that group echoed views expressed by women
of color in the early 1970s. Writing in the late 1960s and early
1970s, Florynce Kennedy and Frances Beal suggested that women of color
needed more than freedom from government meddling.193 As Beal explained
in 1969: “The lack of the availability of safe birth control methods, the
forced sterilization practices, and the inability to obtain legal abortions are
all symptoms of a decadent society that jeopardizes the health of black wo-
men (and thereby the entire black race). . . .”194
In the wake of a series of scandals, feminists concluded that women
needed not just legal abortion but a radically different model of healthcare.
In 1969, one year after sales of the birth-control pill reached the $150 mil-
lion mark, magazine columnist Barbara Seaman exposed the mostly unre-
ported dangers associated with the popular contraceptive method.195 In 1971,
other studies revealed that diethylstilbestrol (DES), a popular drug thought
to reduce the risk of miscarriages, led to increased cancer rates later in life
192 On the history of the feminist women’s health movement, see, for example, SAN-
DRA MORGEN, INTO OUR OWN HANDS: THE WOMEN’S HEALTH MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1969–1990 (2002); SHERYL BURT RUZEK, THE WOMEN’S HEALTH
MOVEMENT: FEMINIST ALTERNATIVES TO MEDICAL CONTROL 144–46, 151 (1978).
193 See SCHULDER & KENNEDY, ABORTION RAP, supra note 38; Beal, Black Women’s R
Manifesto, supra note 38, at 52. R
194 Beal, Black Women’s Manifesto, supra note 38, at 52. R
195 On sales of the pill, see, for example, RICKIE SOLINGER, PREGNANCY AND POWER:
A SHORT HISTORY OF REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH POLITICS IN AMERICA 171–72 (2005). For
the text of Seaman’s work, see BARBARA SEAMAN, THE DOCTORS’ CASE AGAINST THE
PILL: 25TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION (1995). On the importance of Seaman’s work, see, for
example, ELAINE TYLER MAY, AMERICA AND THE PILL: A HISTORY OF PROMISE, PERIL,
AND LIBERATION 130–34 (2010); MORGEN, supra note 192, at 8–10. R
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for women exposed to the drug in utero.196 These scandals magnified worries
that medical professionals prevented women from making informed deci-
sions about the care they received.197
In response to those concerns, in the 1960s, women worked to develop
a new model of healthcare delivery, opening feminist women’s health cen-
ters in a number of metropolitan areas.198 Carol Downer, a member of the
NOW Abortion Committee, had popularized the idea of women-centered
care in the early 1970s, embarking with her colleague Lorraine Rothman on
a 1971 national tour in which she demonstrated cervical self-exams.199 In
1973, the Boston Women’s Health Collective put out a volume, Our Bodies,
Ourselves, that served as a rallying cry for the emerging women’s health
movement.200 By 1975–1976, the feminist women’s health movement turned
to health advocacy to advance a distinctive vision of social change.201
Founded in 1975, one group leading this effort, the National Women’s Health
Network (NWHN), brought together a number of influential individuals and
organizations critical of the medical mainstream.202
In 1977, NWHN began a campaign to fund free abortions and joined
NOW, NARAL, and several other women’s health groups in coordinated
protests against bans on the public funding of abortion.203 As NWHN be-
came more deeply involved in abortion politics in 1977–1978, leaders of the
organization became more critical of the mainstream abortion-rights move-
ment. NWHN’s position paper highlighted the belief that abortion was one of
several interrelated issues of reproductive freedom.204 NWHN members be-
lieved that effective abortion advocacy had to touch on other issues of repro-
ductive health or even social justice.205 According to NWHN members,
women chose abortion partly because of the lack of child-care alternatives,
196 On the DES scandal, see, for example, DAVIS, supra note 39, at 238; MORGEN, R
supra note 192, at 10. R
197 See, e.g., DIANA BARBARA DUTTON, WORSE THAN THE DISEASE: PITFALLS OF
MEDICAL PROGRESS 230–35 (1988).
198 On the spread of such clinics, see, for example, MORGEN, supra note 192, at 100. R
199 See id. at 22–24; BROWNMILLER, supra note 40, at 125–128; WENDY KLINE, BOD- R
IES OF KNOWLEDGE: SEXUALITY, REPRODUCTION, AND WOMEN’S HEALTH IN THE SECOND
WAVE 74 (2010).
200 See DAVIS, supra note 39, at 100–01; MORGEN, supra note 192, at 241. For analy- R
sis of the impact of the volume, see, for example, DAVIS, supra note 39, at 18. R
201 See MORGEN, supra note 192, at 27–29. R
202 See id. at 29–31; SUZANNE STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGAN-
IZATION AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT 168–69 (1991); Meeting Minutes,
NWHN (Aug. 7–8, 1976) (available in the Barbara Seaman Papers, MS 141, Schlesinger
Library, Harvard University).
203 On NWHN’s mobilization around issues tied to the Hyde Amendment, see, for
example, Press Release, NWHN, Launching of the Women’s Health Network “One on
One Campaign” (1977) (available in the Barbara Seaman Papers, MS 142, Schlesinger
Library, Harvard University); Letter from NWHN to President Jimmy Carter et al. (Aug.
11, 1977) (available in the Barbara Seaman Papers, MS 142, Schlesinger Library,
Harvard University).
204 See id.
205 See id.
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welfare rights, and health-care options available to them, and any true sup-
porter of abortion rights had an obligation to campaign for a full array of
reproductive health choices as much as for legal abortion itself.206
Another organization, the Committee for Abortion Rights and Against
Sterilization Abuse (CARASA), saw the creation of a broad reproductive
rights agenda as necessary for any meaningful reproductive choice.207 In
1978, CARASA and other reproductive-justice groups formed a national or-
ganization, the Reproductive Rights National Network (R2N2), to promote a
radical, law-reform agenda for reproductive rights.208 R2N2 brought together
over fifty progressive and feminist groups committed to the vision articu-
lated by founding member Meredith Katz, who urged supporters of abortion
rights to go beyond a single issue agenda.209 R2N2 later described the rea-
sons for its founding as follows: “We have purposely chosen not to become
a single issue organization because we feel the issues of access to childcare,
jobs, and health care are inseparable parts of a woman’s right to reproductive
choice.”210
Founding members heavily criticized the mainstream movement’s sin-
gle-issue focus.211 R2N2 members believed that a single issue agenda re-
flected the illegitimate aims of a population control movement interested in
controlling poor and non-white women.212 In response, member organiza-
tions of R2N2 worked to prove that the organization remained “as commit-
ted to defending the reproductive rights of working-class and minority
women as we are to abortion rights, and that [members saw] the relation-
ship between the two.”213
To R2N2 members, a single issue agenda also seemed doomed to fail.
Abortion enjoyed little public support, and, standing alone, a right to abor-
tion meant little to women exposed to sterilization abuse or struggling to pay
for birth control or child care.214 As one member group explained: “We dis-
tinguish ourselves from NOW, NARAL, PP, and others on the abortion issue
in that we see abortion as a key part of women’s control over reproduction,
206 See id.
207 On CARASA’s history, see, for example, REBECCA M. KLUCHIN, FIT TO BE TIED:
STERILIZATION AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERICA, 1950–1980 196–98 (2009); JEN-
NIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 150–55
(2003).
208 See, e.g., KLINE, supra note 199, at 92. R
209 Id. at 92–93.
210 Brochure, Reproductive Rights National Network, Women United to Defend
Abortion Rights and End Sterilization Abuse (n.d., ca. 1980) (available in the Reproduc-
tive Rights National Network Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University).
211 See, e.g., KLINE, supra note 199, at 91–93; NELSON, supra note 207, at 137–49. R
212 NELSON, supra note 207, at 149–50. R
213 Id. at 150.
214 See, e.g., id. at 147–50.
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not as a single issue or as part of a policy of population control by the gov-
ernment or medical establishment.”215
B. A New Political Environment Makes a Single-Issue Approach
More Compelling
In the early 1980s, however, new political challenges undercut the mo-
mentum R2N2 had built for a broader reproductive rights platform. In 1981,
antiabortion proposals circulating in Congress raised concerns within R2N2
about the abortion issue. In 1980, Ronald Reagan won a landslide election,
and Republicans took control of the Senate.216 Abortion opponents claimed
that a majority of members of the House and “44 out of 100 senators” op-
posed abortion.217 Between fall of 1980 and early 1981, several major pieces
of antiabortion legislation came before Congress. Senator Jesse Helms (R-
NC) proposed a statute concluding, contrary to Roe, that life began at con-
ception.218 Several months later, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) proposed a
constitutional amendment that would undo Roe and allow the states and
Congress to restrict or ban abortion (where state and federal laws conflicted,
the more onerous one would trump).219
In response to the new antiabortion threat in Congress, R2N2 drafted a
task force paper that reflected concerns about the willingness of mainstream
groups to sacrifice the rights of poor women.220 This criticism touched on the
substantive priorities and rhetoric of mainstream groups. As the position pa-
per explained: “The R2N2 recognizes that the ‘individual choice’ perspec-
tive does not provide a sufficient basis for organizing . . . . [T]he social
context within which ‘individual choices’ are made is crucial.”221 Expanding
the movement’s agenda proved to be more difficult, however. R2N2 mem-
215 CARASA, CARASA PROPOSAL ON ABORTION RIGHTS STRATEGY FOR R2N2
(1981) (available in the Reproductive Rights National Network Paper, Bingham Library,
Duke University).
216 On the 1980 election, see, for example, STEPHEN E. FRANTZICH & CLAUDE BER-
UBE, CONGRESS: GAMES AND STRATEGIES 49 (2000).
217 See, e.g., Right to Life Committee Plans Drive for Anti-Abortion Amendment,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1980, at A17.
218 On the human life bill, see, for example, Beck, supra note 80; Abortion Foes Offer R
Bill: Life Begins with Conception, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1981, at 8; Jon Margolis, The
Abortion Struggle on Capitol Hill, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22, 1981, at A2; Weinraub, supra
note 80. On the view that the human life bill was not constitutional, see, for example, The R
Human Life Bill: Hearing on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 242–56 (1981) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe,
Professor, Harvard Law School); id. at 515–75 (1981) (statement of Norman Dorsen,
Professor, New York University School of Law).
219 On the Hatch Amendment, see, for example, Bennetts, Antiabortion Forces, supra
note 81, at B2. R
220 See R2N2, Abortion Task Force Paper, 3–4, 7–8, 10–14, 16–17 (1981) (available
in the Reproductive Rights National Network Papers, Bingham Library, Duke
University).
221 Id. at 10. For the views of R2N2 members on the shortcomings of the mainstream
abortion-rights movement, see, for example, CARASA, supra note 215. R
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bers hotly debated how best to respond to the new antiabortion threat. For
example, Karen Stamm, a veteran member, worried that working with main-
stream groups on abortion issues would dilute the commitment and energy
of R2N2 itself.222
By contrast, New York members leading CARASA believed that repro-
ductive justice activists would have to prioritize the abortion issue in the
near term or risk losing abortion rights altogether. CARASA members also
insisted in presenting abortion as part of a more robust agenda for women’s
control over reproduction, “not as a single issue.”223 Nonetheless, CARASA
members believed that reproductive rights advocates could not afford any
distractions from the abortion issue. As CARASA argued of the human life
bill proposed by Helms  “the actual physical threat . . . to all women cannot
be stressed enough.”224
In spite of the opposition of some member organizations, R2N2 ulti-
mately prioritized the abortion issue at the expense of a broader agenda. In
draft, the organization’s position paper on abortion explained that R2N2 had
“selected abortion rights as [its] focus for this period because of the imme-
diacy of the attack from the New Right.”225 The final draft simply stated:
“[t]he defense of abortion rights is the most urgent task facing the women’s
movement.”226 The single-issue approach taken by R2N2 and the main-
stream movement reflected two interrelated trends. With the emergence of
the human life bill and the Hatch Amendment, legal abortion appeared to be
in imminent peril.227 The antiabortion movement appeared ready to undo re-
productive rights women already enjoyed. Asking for broader rights likely
seemed unrealistic.
The success of antiabortion politicians foreshadowed a larger change to
the American political landscape, as Ronald Reagan and his allies re-charac-
terized welfare rights as a source of dependency and out-of-control costs.228
When the idea of rights to state support lost popularity, the reproductive
rights agenda promoted by R2N2 seemed out of reach. During his political
rise, Reagan successfully championed a new policy vision, neoliberalism,
which had emerged in the academy in the 1930s and 1940s.229 Drawing on
222 See Karen Stamm, Summary of Recent Activity on Sterilization Abuse Seen in
Light of Future Organizing Possibilities (Mar. 1981) (available in the Reproductive
Rights National Network Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University) (expressing con-
cern about the ideological and tactical costs of a partnership with mainstream abortion-
rights groups).
223 CARASA, supra note 215, at 1. R
224 Id.
225 R2N2, Abortion Task Force Paper (Draft 1981) (available in the Reproductive
Rights National Network Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University).
226 R2N2, Abortion Task Force Paper, supra note 220. R
227 See, e.g., id.
228 On Reagan’s small government rhetoric, see, for example, GIL TROY, MORNING IN
AMERICA: HOW RONALD REAGAN INVENTED THE 1980S 26, 40, 342 (2005).
229 On the re-framing of welfare and bipartisan consensus that the welfare system
required reform, see, for example, DANIEL BE´LAND & ALEX WADDAN, THE POLITICS OF
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the work of theorists from Friedrich Hayek to Milton Friedman, neoliberals
in the academy lent new credibility to arguments for the virtues of small
government.230 During the 1980 election, Ronald Reagan translated neoliber-
alism into a popular attack on big government.231 Drawing on suggestions
from think tanks such as Paul Weyrich’s Heritage Foundation, Reagan
praised market-based policy solutions, low taxes, and a leaner and more effi-
cient federal government.232 In particular, Reagan attacked the welfare state
for being too large and too likely to undercut Americans’ independence and
self-respect.233 To some extent, Reagan’s rhetoric reflected growing hostility
to welfare rights expressed by both political parties. Like his successor, Ron-
ald Reagan, Democrat Jimmy Carter promised to increase “self-sufficiency
through work rather than welfare.”234 With grassroots conservatism on the
rise, Democrats and Republicans appeared to have rejected the idea of a
broad right to state support on which R2N2 relied.235
In this new political environment, defending a broad reproductive rights
platform seemed at best unrealistic and at worst counterproductive. The idea
of welfare rights no longer appeared to resonate with the American public.
Moreover, if R2N2 did not prioritize the defense of legal abortion, feminists
feared they would lose the few reproductive rights they already enjoyed.236
The story of the broader reproductive-justice framework that emerged
in the 1970s raises important questions about leading studies on Roe’s im-
pact. The Supreme Court’s decision supposedly led feminists to narrow their
demands and to neglect other reproductive-rights issues. As we have seen,
however, some abortion-rights groups developed a more comprehensive re-
productive-justice framework in the immediate aftermath of Roe. The deci-
sion played only a limited part in shaping abortion politics.
Reproductive-justice activists, like contemporary scholars, viewed a
single-issue strategy as problematic and offered a far-reaching alternative.
POLICY CHANGE: WELFARE, MEDICARE, AND SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM IN THE UNITED
STATES 44 (2012); ANDREW E. BUSCH, RONALD REAGAN AND THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM
103 (2001); MARISSA CHAPPELL, THE WAR ON WELFARE: FAMILY, POVERTY, AND POLIT-
ICS IN MODERN AMERICA 199–200 (2011).
230 See, e.g., DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIED-
MAN, AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS 4–7 (2012).
231 See, e.g., id. at 6.
232 See, e.g., MONICA PRASAD, THE POLITICS OF FREE MARKETS: THE RISE OF NE-
OLIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICIES IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES
49–53 (2006); JONES, supra note 230, at 263–66. R
233 See, e.g., BE´LAND & WADDAN, supra note 229, at 43–44; CHAPPELL, supra note R
229, at 199. R
234 Jimmy Carter, The State of the Union Annual Message to Congress (Jan 16,
1981), archived at http://perma.cc/N6V5-TRAY. On Carter’s interest in deregulation, see,
for example, JONES, supra note 230, at 248. R
235 See, e.g., id. at 180–216; see also PRASAD, supra note 232, at 45–62. R
236 By 1984, R2N2 dissolved, as Suzanne Staggenborg explains, largely “because of
a lack of money and national leadership.” STAGGENBORG, supra note 202 at 169. R2N2 R
and CARASA also struggled because of internal divisions concerning the priority the
organization should assign to questions of race. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 207, at R
139–40.
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Roe did little to dissuade these activists. Among feminist women’s health
advocates, it was changes to abortion politics that made a narrow reform
platform more compelling.
III. ORDINARY POLITICS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND SOCIAL CHANGE
What would happen if abortion rights were no longer constitutional?
For pro-choice activists, there would be obvious costs. Some states, includ-
ing those with trigger laws (statutes that would automatically ban abortion
upon the overruling of Roe), would ban or more heavily regulate abortion.237
Nonetheless, scholars have pointed to a number of benefits that might follow
the de-constitutionalization of abortion rights. Movement members cannot
directly control whether the Supreme Court (or any other state actor) contin-
ues to afford protection to abortion rights. Just the same, if the costs of de-
fending those constitutional protections far exceed any benefit, movement
members would have reason to redirect scarce funds and political influence
toward more valuable goals.238
Drawing on the history presented in Parts I and II, this Section reexam-
ines several of the benefits that scholars argue would follow from the de-
constitutionalization of the abortion issue. Leading studies have spotlighted
the shortcomings of a single-issue strategy based on choice. However, as this
Section shows, movement members turned time and time again to choice
arguments when they believed that the courts would no longer protect abor-
tion rights. Similarly, the realities of national elections and political deal-
making pushed the movement toward a single-issue agenda. The Supreme
Court’s intervention does not explain the continuing emphasis put on what
many find to be an inadequate approach to reproductive rights. The Section
concludes by illuminating some of the first steps movement members might
take to change the political circumstances that make a single-issue, choice-
based framework so appealing: specifically, confronting head-on the diffi-
cult moral questions surrounding abortion and making more visible the wo-
men who choose abortion. In the past, movement leaders have experimented
effectively (if temporarily) with similar strategies. By building on such tac-
237 On the status of trigger laws, see generally Matt Berns, Trigger Laws, 97 GEO.
L.J. 1639, 1639–88 (2009); ‘Roe v. Wade’: The Divided States of America, USA TODAY,
(Apr. 17, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-04-16-abortion-states_
x.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/SU7Z-EYJ.
238 See, e.g., Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For and To
Social Movements: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
11–12 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds. 2006) (summarizing some of the costs and
benefits movements face when litigating); Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Con-
stitution, 99 VA. L. REV. >For 1435, 1504 (2013) (explaining that those “sharing an
interest in vindicating a certain vision of the Constitution will often not be able to muster
the resources to support costly, time-consuming, and uncertain federal court litigation”).
For further discussion of gay rights litigation, see GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 341 (2d ed. 2008).
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tics, the movement might finally remove some of the stigma surrounding the
abortion procedure and the women who seek it out.
A. Reconsidering the Costs of Constitutionalizing the Abortion Issue
The abortion-rights movement cannot dictate whether the Supreme
Court preserves, modifies, or rejects existing protections for abortion rights.
Just the same, the value that activists attach to those constitutional protec-
tions can shape crucial strategic decisions. If preserving a constitutional
abortion right matters a great deal, movement leaders may commit substan-
tial financial resources to litigation and to the federal judicial nomination
process.239  By contrast, if constitutional protections have actually damaged
the movement’s cause, activists would be better served by focusing on more
productive objectives.240 If constitutionalizing abortion hurt the cause of re-
productive rights, then activists should not concern themselves too much
about the overruling of Roe.
By understanding the history of the movement’s turn to a single-issue,
choice-centered approach, we can gain new insight into how de-constitution-
alizing abortion would impact abortion-rights advocacy. According to some
scholars, constitutionalizing the issue has put artificial and destructive con-
straints on the way activists describe abortion access.241 Roe became perenni-
ally vulnerable.242 In defending it, activists were in one way or another
addressing the Court or anticipating the Justices’ responses.243 The rhetoric of
constitutional law, in turn, is limited: an abstract language of obligations and
entitlements that poorly reflects the complexity of many citizens’ views of
abortion.244 De-constitutionalizing abortion would allow activists to address
the people rather than the Court.245
239 Cf. TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HIS-
TORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 135 (2011) (explaining how civil rights activists
“modulated their attitudes toward civil rights lawyers and court-centered activism as cir-
cumstances dictated”).
240 Cf. ROSENBERG, supra note 238, at 341. R
241 See, e.g., West, supra note 7, at 1406 (explaining that choice-based claims “do not R
do justice to the aspirational goals of the women’s movement’s early arguments for repro-
ductive rights”); Mallika Kaur Sarkaria, Comment, Lessons from Punjab’s “Missing
Girls”: Toward a Global Feminist Perspective on “Choice” in Abortion, 97 CALIF. L.
REV. 905, 937 (2009) (arguing that the “U.S. feminist approach to abortion has focused
on ‘choice’ and the ‘right to choose’ ever since the U.S. Supreme Court recognized wo-
men’s right to abortion in Roe v. Wade” and explaining how such binary arguments fail to
capture the needs and experiences of women in the Punjabi context).
242 See, e.g., West, supra note 7, at 1400. R
243 See id. at 1401. For perspective on how constitutional law can shape political
dialogue, see generally GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CON-
STRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS (2009).
244 On the shortcomings of rights rhetoric in the abortion context, see, for example,
West, supra note 7, at 1428; Law, supra note 1, at 1020. R
245 See, e.g., West, supra note 7, at 1404. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\37-2\HLG204.txt unknown Seq: 40 29-MAY-14 11:34
324 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender [Vol. 37
As we have seen, however, in the past several decades, activists used
these apparently problematic choice claims at least partly because they ap-
pealed to voters. At various points, movement members believed that the
courts were a lost cause. Using choice-based claims made sense to activists
trying to build public support or raise money. The need to appeal to those
who did not fully support abortion made choice-based claims more
appealing.
A second supposed benefit of de-constitutionalization involves the pri-
orities of abortion-rights activists—when supporters of reproductive rights
no longer have to defend the Roe decision, they will be better able to find
common ground with the opposition on other issues related to contraception,
health care, and the treatment of pregnant women and new mothers.246 By
working to save constitutional abortion rights at all costs, the movement is
said to have deemphasized other aspects of reproductive healthcare. “By
putting legal abortion in its place—that is, putting it in the context of a
reproductive justice agenda pursued in the legislative arena,” Robin West
asserts, “pro-choice advocates might find common cause with pro-life
movements that responsibly seek greater justice for pregnant women who
choose to carry their pregnancies to term, working families, and struggling
mothers.”247
The history studied here provides some support for these concerns.
Groups like R2N2 and CARASA did abandon a broader agenda when con-
stitutional abortion rights seemed to be in imminent peril. But would activ-
ists prioritize abortion any less if the Court no longer protected it? When the
Justices retreated from Roe in Webster, the opinion provoked a backlash with
the abortion issue at its center.248 The greater the threat to legal abortion, the
more focused reproductive-rights activists seem have to become about en-
suring access to the procedure. If Roe were overruled, we might expect ac-
tivists to put even greater emphasis on the abortion issue, campaigning to
protect what they once took for granted. Activists might also scale back on
their demands for other forms of reproductive justice, as they have in the
past, if they feel that even established rights are under attack. If the history
studied here offers any example, the pro-choice movement might pursue an
even less comprehensive agenda if abortion rights lost protection. Finally,
some scholars suggest that de-constitutionalizing abortion might allow for a
246 See, e.g., id. at 1426–28; Williams, supra note 10, at 1561 (arguing that rights and R
choice rhetoric cast women who pursue their own interests above interests of child as
selfish).
247 West, supra note 7, at 1427. R
248 On post-Webster backlash, see, for example, BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 328–29 (2009); BARBARA M. YARNOLD, ABORTION
POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: RIGHT VERSUS RIGHT 21 (1995); Loretta Ross, Afri-
can-American Women and Abortion, in ABORTION WARS: A HALF-CENTURY OF STRUG-
GLE, 1950–2000, 195 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998).
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more productive dialogue about abortion.249 They argue that the choice
framework is flawed. It privileges individual freedom and does little to jus-
tify or protect women who need assistance from the government.250 It under-
cuts arguments for caretakers’ rights and deemphasizes any connection
between sex equality and fertility control.251 The choice framework presents
abortion as something to which women are entitled, encouraging some to
view women as selfish or irresponsible.252 In addition, the choice framework
discourages discussion of the moral ambiguities of abortion.253
As we have seen, however, the choice framework has enjoyed continu-
ing prominence partly because of the demands of ordinary politics. Repro-
ductive-rights groups have turned to choice-based arguments not only to
influence the courts but also to impact elections and build popular support.
So long as the movement prioritizes lobbying and influencing elections,
choice-based claims will likely remain important. The movement privileges
the idea of choice as a means of exercising the most influence in the short
term, for choice appeals to a broader segment of the population. Choice-
based arguments allow the movement to avoid difficult questions about the
morality of and rationale for abortion.
Seen in historical context, the de-constitutionalization of abortion will
not likely be worth its considerable costs. If the Supreme Court overrules
Roe, many states that currently restrict abortion would ban it entirely.254 Ac-
cess to abortion—already a problem for many—would become even more
rare in many American communities.255 The considerable stigma surrounding
abortion may well increase when state law can once again brand as criminals
any women who seek out the procedure.256 Significantly, however, de-consti-
tutionalization would likely impose these costs without providing any of the
benefits scholars expect. If the Court de-constitutionalizes abortion, many of
the shortcomings we now see—particularly, the rise of unsatisfying choice
arguments and a single-issue agenda—seem likely to persist. In meeting the
demands of ordinary politics, abortion-rights activists have pursued the very
strategies that so many commentators find troubling.
249 See, e.g., West, supra note 7, at 1428–29. R
250 See id. at 1403; Law, supra note 1, at 1020; Rausch, supra note 9, at 62 (“For poor R
women, the right to choose is somewhat bare” without public funding.).
251 See West, supra note 7, at 1403. R
252 See Williams, supra note 10, at 1561 (“[f]eminists have used the rhetoric of R
choice with little understanding of the ways it awakens gender fears about selfish
mothers”).
253 See, e.g., West, supra note 7, at 1421, 1428–30. R
254 On abortion law in a post-Roe world, see, for example, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE,
ABORTION POLICY IN THE ABSENCE OF Roe, State Policies in Brief as of March 1, 2014
(2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ZPQ7-8ESM.
255 On declining access to abortion, see Erik Eckholm, Access to Abortion Falling as
States Pass Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2014, at A1.
256 On the stigma that once surrounded criminal abortions, see LESLIE J. REAGAN,
DANGEROUS PREGNANCIES: MOTHERS, DISABILITIES, AND ABORTION IN MODERN
AMERICA 154 (2010) (doctor who had openly performed illegal abortions explained that
when he went to trial, his colleagues failed to show up for his defense).
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B. Toward a Richer Approach
In order to create a more nuanced conversation about abortion, the
movement will have to focus more on de-stigmatizing those subjects, like
the abortion procedure or publicly funded abortion, about which the public is
the most ambivalent. The mainstream abortion-rights movement has often
focused on legal change.257 In general, organizations like NARAL have pri-
oritized legal access to abortion. The main goal was not to convince the
public of the need for equality or fertility control for women or even to de-
stigmatize the procedure. This focus has involved a distinct set of tradeoffs:
in ensuring legal access to abortion, activists have had to win over a citi-
zenry that is ambivalent about abortion, the welfare state, and even femi-
nism. One can question whether a different set of arguments—such as one
connected to sex equality—would have been more politically resonant. Just
the same, in the decades after Roe, movement members appeared convinced
that choice arguments were less controversial, avoiding the stigma attached
to abortion or the popular disagreements about the size of the welfare state.
It will not be easy to change public attitudes toward abortion, but a few
first steps become apparent. First, abortion-rights activists pursuing such a
goal will likely have to do more to make abortion, and women who benefit
from the procedure, visible and sympathetic to the public.258 Although
roughly four in ten unintended pregnancies result in abortion,259 abortion
comes across as an intensely private subject, inappropriate for public discus-
sion.260 By contrast, beginning in the mid-1960s, abortion opponents devel-
oped slide shows, signs, cartoons, and speeches depicting the fetus as an
infant with a race, sex, and personality.261 By making the fetus more visible,
abortion opponents have successfully made the unborn more sympathetic
257 See, e.g., Anne Valk, Fighting for Abortion as a “Health Right” in Washington,
D.C., in FEMINIST COALITIONS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM
IN THE UNITED STATES 135, 156 (Stephanie Gilmore ed., 2008) (“Implying that legal
changes would enable all women to exercise their voluntary right of choice, the pro-
choice movement obscured the systemic social and economic inequalities that obstructed
women’s ability to control their fertility.”). For further discussion of the legal focus of the
abortion-rights movement, see BEFORE Roe v. Wade, supra note 12, at xiii–xiv. R
258 For examples of efforts of this kind, see I Had An Abortion: Stories of Exper-
iences, EXPERIENCES PROJECT, http://www.experienceproject.com/explore/I-Had-An-
Abortion:-Stories-of-Experiences (last visited Jul. 1, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/
4ZXT-JHYJ; MY ABORTION, MY LIFE, http://www.myabortionmylife.org/pages/sharing-
our-stories.php (last visited Jul. 2, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/AS55-JKB4.
259 Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Feb.
2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/6WDA-76T7.
260 On the framing of abortion as intensely personal, see Linda Gordon, THE MORAL
PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA (2002).
261 See, e.g., SARA DUBOW, OURSELVES UNBORN: A HISTORY OF THE FETUS IN MOD-
ERN AMERICA 1–9 (2011).
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and more human.262 Similarly, beginning in the 1960s, the gay rights move-
ment has dramatically increased the visibility of members of the gay, les-
bian, bisexual, and transgender community.263 For this reason, poll data
consistently show a correlation between the generation to which a person
belongs and the amount of sympathy he has for LGBQT individuals.264
Proponents of abortion rights have at times worked to make women
who have chosen abortion more visible: before 1973, in addressing women
who died during botched abortions, and in the mid-1980s, during the “Silent
No More” Campaign. Generally, these campaigns have been a means to the
end of obtaining or preserving legal access to abortion. If public attitudes
toward the procedure are to change dramatically, however, de-stigmatizing
abortion may well have to become an end in itself.
Second, in order to change popular opinion on abortion, activists likely
will have to confront the morally complex questions surrounding abortion.
One of the political benefits of the choice framework is its ability to move
discussion away from the more uncomfortable questions tied to the issue:
whether abortion involves justified (or unjustified) killing, when and why
women view the fetus as a person, even when choosing abortion, or whether
“opposite-sex partners who do not intend to conceive have a compelling
moral duty to use birth control.”265 Dodging these questions does not make
them go away, and abortion providers, women, and members of the public
confront them when dealing with abortion. Changing public attitudes toward
abortion will likely require activists to reshape public attitudes toward com-
plex aspects of the abortion question.
What role does constitutional law play in these kinds of social change?
A reliance on constitutional law may have set the movement back. While
Roe raised the salience of abortion, the aftereffects of the decision drew at-
262 See, e.g., SOLINGER, supra note 195, at 233 (“[O]nce the fetus/baby became visi- R
ble, valuable, and potentially perfect (or perfectable), the concept of ‘fetal personhood’
flourished.”).
263 On the increasing visibility of gays and lesbians, see, for example, ERIC MARCUS,
MAKING GAY HISTORY: THE HALF-CENTURY FIGHT FOR LESBIAN AND GAY EQUAL
RIGHTS 346 (2002); James W. Button et al., The Politics of Gay Rights at the Local and
State Level, in THE POLITICS OF GAY RIGHTS 274 (Craig A. Rimmerman ed., 2000) (dis-
cussing the embrace of gay rights by a diverse range of municipal governments in the
1990s).
264 On the generational shift, see Most Americans Support Same-Sex Unions, MCBS
NEWS (May 14, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-most-americans-support-
same-sex-unions/, archived at http://perma.cc/GE3J-56NH; Persuasion and the Gay-
Marriage Generation Gap, THE ATLANTIC (May 18, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2012/05/persuasion-and-the-gay-marriage-generation-gap/257365/,
archived at http://perma.cc/3AFG-L3CH.
265 West, supra note 7, at 1429. For an argument dealing with self-defense and the R
idea of fetal killing, see EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK:
FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT 7 (1996). For an example of an effort to reconcile moral
ambivalence about the status of the fetus with support for legal abortion, see, for exam-
ple, Jeannie Ludlow, Sometimes It’s a Child and a Choice: Toward an Embodied Abor-
tion Praxis, 20 FEMINIST FORMATIONS 26, 26–50 (2008).
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tention away from other reproductive-justice issues at times.266 Some abor-
tion-rights advocates, while defending the opinion against criticism from
abortion opponents, justified choice-based claims they might otherwise have
found unconvincing. Similarly, in the courts, abortion-rights supporters have
relied on Roe as binding or persuasive precedent, at times relying on its
privacy rationale rather than developing more compelling constitutional
claims for abortion rights.267
The political opportunities linked to the choice framework, however,
result as much from the particular dynamic of abortion politics as from Roe
itself. Ordinary abortion politics have turned on the availability and legality
of abortion. The choice framework enjoys continued support not only be-
cause the courts have constitutionalized abortion but also because the choice
framework appears to convey political benefits. Creating a more productive
or nuanced abortion debate will require more than the de-constitutionaliza-
tion of the abortion issue.
CONCLUSION
We often think that Roe had a problematic impact on the movement for
reproductive rights. The opinion gave pro-choice activists a tremendous but
tenuous victory. Because abortion rights became vulnerable, Roe encouraged
advocates to sacrifice other goals in order to preserve existing gains. At the
same time, Roe’s rhetoric shaped pro-choice advocacy in the following de-
cades. In defending the opinion’s framing of the abortion issue, the move-
ment made constitutional, choice-based arguments in explaining the
importance of legal abortion.
Viewed in these terms, the constitutionalization of the abortion issue
substantially damaged reproductive-rights advocacy. The Roe opinion sup-
posedly undercut efforts to develop a more comprehensive reproductive-jus-
tice program. Once abortion became an issue of constitutional law, the
movement emphasized choice-based contentions at the expense of more
nuanced and convincing arguments.
While scholars compellingly demonstrate the shortcomings of the
choice framework, no one has done a comprehensive history of the reasons
266 For discussion of the way in which court decisions can raise the salience of partic-
ular issues, see MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 464 (2004) (describing how decisions
can generate backlash); Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 12 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008).
267 For arguments of this kind made in Supreme Court amicus curiae briefs, see Brief
for the National Organization for Women et al. as Amici Curiae, Thornburgh v. Am. Coll.
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-495, 84-1379), 1985
WL 669622, at *1–4; Brief for Appellees, Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490 (1989) (No. 88-605), 1989 WL 1127727, at *1–11; Brief for Petitioners and Cross-
Respondents, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902),
1992 WL 12006398, at *23–27.
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for its continuing influence. In spite of common and biting criticism, why
have leaders of the abortion-rights movement often pursued a single-issue,
choice-driven agenda? This Article closes this gap in existing scholarship,
making clear that ordinary politics have reinforced the choice framework.
Choice-based claims have continued to play a substantial part in abortion-
rights advocacy because those claims are believed to enjoy popular support.
The goals of ordinary abortion politics—maximizing public approval and
legal access to abortion—make choice claims more, rather than less,
prominent.
Ordinary politics also reinforced interest in a single-issue approach. Be-
ginning in the late 1970s, constitutional protections for abortion seemed to
be in almost constant crisis. As American politics moved to the political
right, the movement no longer believed it possible to advance a robust repro-
ductive-justice agenda.
Removing the Constitution from discussion of abortion can only do so
much. The participants in the abortion debate deserve a discussion that is
more complex and fulfilling. However, constitutional law can neither give us
such a discussion nor take it away. Abortion-rights supporters will have do
that work themselves.
